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Security is becoming an increasing concern in electronic devices recently. Specifically,
since the embedded systems and Internet of Things (IoTs) have become necessary parts
of our life, more and more vulnerabilities are detected and made use of by attackers.
Moreover, as the electronic component supply chain grows more complex due to glob-
alization, with parts coming from a diverse set of suppliers, counterfeit electronics have
been a major challenge that calls for immediate solutions. This is because the tradi-
tional solutions that using static digital ID and keys can be easily obtained or cloned.
The current best practice is to place a secret key in non-volatile memory such as fuses
and EEPROM, and use cryptographic primitives to authenticate a device and protect
confidential information. To reduce the vulnerability of the systems, we have devel-
oped multiple methodologies in this work. The proposed methods include: the design
optimization and implementation of ring oscillator physical unclonable function (RO
PUF) on field programmable gate arrays (FPGA); a novel phase calibrated RO PUF and
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the corresponding authentication solution; a PUF initialization table (PIT) that provides
high accurate authentication; a PIT-based floating thresholding algorithm for key gen-
eration; a lightweight ring weight algorithm (RWA) that can be applied to the low-cost
authentication; an efficient locality sensitive hash function (LSH) for not only similarity
search, but also data clustering.
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In recent times, electronic devices have become so popular in our life, making people
rely on the safety and security of those embedded systems and IoTs. When we store our
sensitive information on these untrusted devices, the system vulnerabilities offer the at-
tackers great opportunities of obtaining individual information. Unfortunately, though
many conventional solutions have been applied to improve the security level, there are
always new adversaries developed. As a fundamental reason, the vulnerabilities come
from the hardware design and supply chain. To solve the problem, physical unclonable
functions (PUF) are recommended as a secure solution of authentication, random num-
ber generation and key generation, which provides multiple features against hardware
and software attacks. By implementing PUFs in the systems, commercial products
overcome the traditional security shortages to a certain degree.
1
21.1 Security Vulnerabilities of Embedded Systems and IoTs
Not as much work has been done in secure system design despite its importance in
establishing security and trust for embedded systems, SoCs, and IoTs. The vulnerabili-
ties of these systems include physical tampering, malware attack, information leakage,
and other aspects. The main threat of hardware is the counterfeit chips in the supply
chain, which contains processors (ASICs, FPGAs, and microprocessors), nonvolatile
memories (Flash memories, ROM, and RAM), IPs, and PCBs. As a consequence, ef-
fective protocols are required to authenticate and authorize each component in the sys-
tem during the initialization. Apart from countermeasures, a secure hardware should
also consider some methods against the probing attacks, snooping attacks, hardware
Trojans, power analysis attacks, electromagnetic attacks and machine learning attacks.
On the software side, there are brute-force attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, buffer
overflow attacks, fault injection attacks and others. To protect the system, people de-
veloped secure programming languages with trusted compiler and libraries, architecture
and OS based countermeasures, static and dynamic code analyzers, and sandboxing ap-
proaches. Nevertheless, a system level design flow with security consideration has not
been discussed widely yet.
1.2 Hardware Security Components
As we know, the traditional security solution mainly relies on the cryptography algo-
rithms. Though they are very practical in reality, researchers have successfully devel-
3oped side-channel attacks against many hardware cryptography implementations. In-
stead, trusted platform module has been proposed as a complex security solution in the
computer system. However, such a high-cost design cannot be applied to lightweight
embedded systems or IoTs. Meanwhile, different true number random generators (TRNGs)
have been proposed these years. Hardware RNG can be used for key generation in cer-
tain applications, but it does not provide deterministic results. Thus, the application
is limited. Another security related module is one-way hash function. Though it is
deterministic and stable, complex computation is required.
To overcome the limitation of those existing methods, researchers tried to use the
random process variations that are generated during the manufacturing process. Since
the components and circuits on the board have their own uncontrollable parameters, it is
possible to use the uniqueness to create unpredictable response. With this consideration
in mind, physical unclonable functions were proposed by Gassend et al [1]. As a phys-
ical component, a PUF is very hard to duplicate or predict due to the results of random
uncontrollable variables in the manufacturing process. When a PUF receives a chal-
lenge, it reacts with a response, which is known as a Challenge-Response Pair (CRP).
An ideal PUF-based CRP provides strong advantages in that each response gives neg-
ligible information on the responses from different challenges to the same PUF or even
identical challenges on different PUFs [2]. Rather than storing secrets in non-volatile
memories, PUFs can provide significantly higher physical security by generating these
secrets from unique PUF responses [3]. A PUF can be broadly classified as a “strong
4PUF” or a “weak PUF”. The fundamental difference between weak and strong PUFs
is the number of unique challenges that the PUF can process [4]. Both contain the
same characteristics including randomness, uniqueness, and reliability. A PUF pro-
vides random output according to different input by involving the physical variations
in the manufacturing process. This is significantly important in random number and
secure key generation. Secondly, the output of PUFs must be unique. Given the same
input, two PUFs output different values. As a result, it is hard to predict the responses
of one PUF even if all the data is tested on another PUF. Finally, an ideal PUF should
generate deterministic output, which is the basic requirement of key generation and au-
thentication applications. Therefore, PUFs can be applied as a source of random but
reliable data for applications such as generating unique IC identification numbers or
encryption keys.
1.3 Problem Statement
Though PUFs have many advantages, it is not a perfect primitive for security applica-
tions. The biggest challenge of using PUFs is its instability in the output. It is essential
that the PUF responds with consistent results given the same challenge. However, most
PUF constructions are not 100% reliable. Because the physical variations have very
limited effect on the output, the result sometimes stays in a metastability condition.
Meanwhile, temperature, voltage, and other factors affect the stability to some degree.
For TRNGs, bit errors may be positive and acceptable. However, authentication and
5key generation applications require deterministic values in most scenarios. The high
raw bit error rate (RBER) in the responses of PUFs needs strong error correcting codes
(ECC) to guarantee a low false negative rate. However, a strong ECC requires large
memory space and high calculation complexity. When the decoding demands are large
enough, electronics systems with limited computation and storage capabilities may not
be able to afford the burden. As a result, traditional PUFs may not offer enough reli-
ability for industrial applications. In this work, we will mainly discuss how we solve
the instability of PUFs. Multiply solutions are offered to address the problem under
different applications and requirements.
1.4 Related Works and Limitation
To solve the instability issue of PUFs, post-processing methods are widely involved.
Since security-critical products require very low bit error rate of their cryptographic
keys, those optimized PUFs cannot be used directly as key generators. Therefore, var-
ious HDAs have been proposed to maximize the stability in PUF responses. As indus-
trial practical solutions, error correction schemes ensures the key to be reproducible [5].
For example, Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) codes can provide high accuracy
by encoding and decoding data with large arrays [6, 7]. However, ECC also means
heavy redundancies. When the key length grows, the required codeword can be ex-
tremely large while the decoding time becomes significantly long. This redundant data
also leaks information about the PUF response itself leading to a potential security
6vulnerability. Another disadvantage is that ECC has a strict limitation on the maxi-
mum number of bits it can correct. Given a number of errors beyond its capability,
ECC will lose its functionality. Alternatively, bit selection schemes become popular re-
cently [5, 8, 9]. As a lightweight soft-decision coding, the least reliable bits in responses
are discarded during the bit selection process. The most intuitive idea is to impose a
global threshold and filter out all mismatched bits. Relatively, local thresholding retains
only the most reliable bits [5]. However, those algorithms have poor resistance to the
variety of models caused by process variation or environmental noise. The reason is
that some unstable bits will either cross the threshold or change the sequence, which
means former models are no longer suitable. As a result, it is hard to regenerate the
same bit set with the original sequence, and no bit errors cannot be guaranteed. Ac-
cording to the HDAs described above, both error correction and bit selection schemes
are not satisfying in term of PUF stability improvement.
1.5 Contributions
In this work, we devote the main paragraph to the design and algorithm of PUF sta-
bility, which includes the optimization design, implementation, various authentication
solution, and key generation method. Specially, the contributions are list as follows:
71.5.1 PUF Design Optimization and Implementation
We optimize the traditional PUF design by replacing the challenge register with a shift
register or hash function. We also modify the architecture for timing improvement.
Details of implementing PUF on FPGAs are discussed. Furthermore, a phase calibrated
PUF is proposed to reduce the bit errors.
1.5.2 Post Processing Authentication Algorithm
We propose several authentication algorithms for different scenarios. Ring weight al-
gorithm is a lightweight solution with limited computation, overhead, and accuracy.
PUF initialization table provides very low false negative and false positive, though the
calculation amount is much larger than RWA. Unstable-stable response is a trade-off
between those two methods.
1.5.3 Solution for Key Generation Applications
By recording the feature of PUF in PITs, a floating thresholding key generation al-
gorithm is discussed in this work. We involve both bit selection and error correction
methods in the solution to improve the stability as much as we can. Meanwhile, security
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Physical Unclonable functions map a set of inputs (challenges) to a set of outputs (re-
sponses) which are called challenge-response pairs (CRPs). During the PUF design
and implementation, we make use of random variations of manufactured structures to
derive an uniquely individual behavior for each Integrated Circuit (IC). In order to har-
ness theses PUF properties, these individual variations must be extracted and mapped;
which is almost impossible since process variations and noises are not clonable. PUFs
came to the stage at a time when traditional cryptography failed to stand its ground
against physical attacks, side-channel attacks, etc. A significant advantage of PUF-
based authentication is that unlike traditional key-based cryptographic systems, a PUF
does not require the storage of secret keys in non-volatile memory. Instead, the secret
key is hidden within the physical body (e.g. intrinsic properties) of the circuitry which




2.1 Strong and Weak PUFs
PUFs are usually classified into strong and weak depending on the number of challenge-
response pairs (CRP) that they can handle. Weak PUFs support a small number of CRPs
which are linearly related to the number of components used to build the PUF. They
possess essentially a single, fixed challenge, as for example in the case of SRAM PUFs
and DRAM PUFs. Strong PUFs, on the other hand, support a large number of CRPs
such that polynomial time attacks become unfeasible. The lack of access restriction
mechanisms on strong PUFs is therefore a key difference from weak PUFs. These
type of PUFs are usually employed for device authentication applications. As with any
embedded system design and IoT devices, there is an inherent trade-off between the
constraints of the operational environment and the desired functional capabilities of the
device.
2.2 Ring Oscillator PUF
A ring oscillator PUF (RO PUF) is a typical example of delay PUFs whose instabil-
ity has been heavily studied but remains unsolved. Figure 2.1 shows the traditional
RO PUF design, which contains an array of ring oscillators (RO), two multiplexers
(MUXes), two counters, and a comparator. Because of manufacturing variations, the
wire delay of each RO is not controllable, which leads to different frequencies of the
RO output. By selecting two ROs according to the PUF input, we can measure the
pulses in a defined unit time with the counters. For example, if the first counter holds
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the larger value than the second one, the PUF output is ‘1’. Otherwise the PUF output is
‘0’. Ideally, the output keeps the same bit value giving a certain input, but in reality bit
errors and bias are involved in the output. Though the systematic or correlated process
variation and the environmental noise caused by the voltage and temperature variations
degrade the output stability [10], the bit errors of FPGA-based PUFs are directly gen-
erated by a selected pair of ROs with close frequencies, which lead to the unstable
measurement in the counters and the flipped output in the comparator. In [11], RO
PUFs are characterized over 125 FPGAs. To improve the quality of ROs, the surround-
ing logic effect on the oscillator frequencies was studied and a strategy was proposed by
placing and comparing ROs in a chain-like structure [12]. A reliability-improvement
technique was used in pre-quantization phase of RO PUFs to reduce the noise in PUF
responses [13]. More optimized approaches were mentioned in [14] by introducing
configurable ROs. They also suggested to compare adjacent RO pairs by controlled RO
placement, but the FPGA implementations were not clear. A group-based RO PUF was
introduced in [15], which described a framework to filter the systematic variation and
improve the hardware efficiency. However, its responses still required ECC.
2.3 Arbiter PUF
The arbiter PUF (APUF) is another typical delay PUF, which is widely studied and
evaluated [16]. An Arbiter PUF extracts the device-specific variation as delay differ-
ence between two selector chains. In another word, the generic idea behind arbiter
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Fig. 2.1: The architecture of a traditional RO PUF
PUF is to race the delay times between two signals. The two signals propagate through
various routes depending on the value of the challenge. As shown in Figure 2.2, each
challenge bit selects the input path of a MUX pair. Since the location of the MUXes
are different, the input wire delay may not be exactly the same. The final value of the
1-bit response is determined by which signal arrives first. Thus, its output should be
either ‘0’ or ‘1’, but it is unpredictable. Note that the pattern is also determined by
the input length. If the challenge has n bits, the propagation delay time should have 2n
combinations. Early work on Arbiter PUF modeling attacks had described successful
approaches already, including the standard Arbiter PUF, XOR Arbiter PUF, lightweight
PUF, and Feed-Forward Arbiter PUF [17, 18].
Fig. 2.2: The architecture of a traditional Arbiter PUF
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2.4 Bistable RO PUF
Similar to an SRAM cell that contains a pair of cross-coupled inverters, the bistable RO
PUF (BR PUF) is based on the fact that an inverter ring consisting of an even number of
inverters has two possible stable states. Figure 2.3 shows an example of a 64-stage BR
PUF [19]. Each stage contains two NOR gates, a DEMUX as gate input, and a MUX as
gate output. Thus, when a 64-bit challenge is received by this BR PUF, either the upper
or the lower paths of the MUX and DEMUX are selected. When we apply different
challenges, different combinations of NOR gates and paths are selected as a result. In
Figure 2.3, the total number of input patterns is 264. In order to generate a response,
the whole PUF needs to be reset as “high” first. After the challenge is applied to the
bistable rings, we wait until the bistable rings to be ‘0’. A reset of “low” is launched
afterwards. Then we wait for some time to let the bistable ring stabilize. Finally, we
read out a 1-bit response. To generate more bits for responses, we repeat the progress
for certain loops.
Fig. 2.3: The architecture of a typical BR PUF
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2.5 Butterfly PUF
A Butterfly PUF (BPUF) includes a cross-coupled circuit, which is brought to the un-
stable state until it becomes stable. To make it clear, a cross-coupled circuit provides a
positive feedback to record the value in a loop. It has two stable state and one unstable
state. The unstable state can be easily changed to one of the stable states by a certain
input. The behavior of BPUF is similar to the SRAM cell. As Figure 2.4 shown, the
structure of 1-bit BPUF is as simple as two latches [20]. When the input signal is set
to high, the BPUF becomes unstable at the beginning. If the input is set to low then,
the BPUF turns to be one of the stable state, with an output of ‘0’ or ‘1’. The final
state only depends on the wire delay of the circuit. Originally, since attackers cannot
measure the internal delay of an FPGA or ASIC directly, it is hard to predict which
state the BPUF is in. However, as the side-channel attacks become popular, they brings
new vulnerabilities to BPUFs.
2.6 DRAM PUF
DRAM PUF (DPUF) was recently proposed as a new type of PUF [21, 22], compared
to the widely studies of SRAM PUF [8, 23]. According to Figure 2.5, there are three
approaches to use DRAM as PUFs. The first one makes use of the built-in-self-refresh
module of DRAM chips. As we know, DRAM not only requires a power supply to
retain data, but must also be periodically refreshed to prevent their data contents from
fading away from the capacitors in their integrated circuits. Therefore, we can initialize
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Fig. 2.4: The architecture of a typical butterfly PUF
all cells to ‘1’ and then turn off with refresh. Some cells will leak to ‘0’ while others
are still ‘1’. Another approach is to use the remanence of DRAM cells. When a DRAM
powers off, the data fades away over time in a random way. Thus, the remanence effect
can also be applied to PUF. The final method is to use the startup value of DRAM.
During startup, the storage capacitor has neither been charged nor discharged. Thus
the voltage of the capacitor is equal to the bias voltage. Because of the manufactur-
ing variations, the capacitance will be slight different, which means a random value
assignment.
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Fig. 2.5: The meory structure of a DRAM array
2.7 Performance Comparison
Table 2.1 shows different types of implemented, and designed, PUFs performance com-
parison in details. As shown in this Table, the first column demonstrates various per-
formance metrics that need to be considered for each PUF in order to evaluate the
effectiveness of each design. Note that the data of RO, abiter, BR, and butterfly PUF
are from our implementation and measurement. We also list the memory-based PUF
as a comparison. One should notice that the other major difference between the first
four presented PUF designs and the fifth (DRAM) PUF is that the “PUF Type” differs
between strong (large number of CRPs) and weak (small number of CRPs). The next
metric that we evaluated was “Key length”, which was “128 bits” for every one of the
PUF designs we examined. The “lookup table” and “flip flop” rows show the number of
those elements used to implement each PUF solution on an FPGA. One should note that
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DRAM has no values for this, since it is implemented using a commercial off the shelf
(COTS) DRAM memory and not an FPGA. The “basic cells” row show the number
of cells and type of cells (e.g. multiplexers, ring oscillators, inverters, demultiplexers,
flash, memory) that we required to implement each PUF solution. The next metric we
evaluated each PUF design using was “bit error rate”; defined as percentage of bit flips
that occur. One should note that this is a good representation of the stability of each
type of PUF. The “bias” represents the percentage of 1s and 0s in the generated output.
Please note that the presented bias is in terms of the number of 0s present in the output.
The following metric, “uniqueness”, is a measure of how uncorrelated the response bits
are across multiple implementations of the same PUF design. Ideally the response bit
should differ with a probability of 50%. A key point to make on the uniqueness pre-
sented is that the RO and DRAM PUFs have a difference of half the bits (e.g. 50%).
The last property is “randomness”; a measure of the unpredictability of the response
bits. For our proposed PUF, the randomness results show promising capability of our
new models. From this table of data we are able to compare and contrast the various
solutions to determine those most favorable to any given scenario.
2.8 Contributions
In this chapter, we introduce five types of PUFs: Ring Oscillator PUF, Arbiter PUF, Bi-
Stable PUF, Butterfly PUF, and DRAM PUF. The details of design and implementation
are discussed in each section. Finally, we compare the performance of these PUFs. The
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Table 2.1: Different PUF Performance Comparison
PUF Design Arbiter RO BR Butterfly DRAM
PUF Category Delay-based Delay-based Delay-based Delay-based Memory-based
PUF Type Strong Strong Strong Strong Weak
Key Length (bit) 128 128 128 128 128
Lookup Table 97 3316 75 38960 N/A
Flip Flop 68 2675 30 16912 N/A
Basic Cells 56 MUXes 256 ROs 28 DE/MUXes 32768 Latches 921 DRAM Memory
Bit Error Rate 3.31% 7.12% 1.42% 6.80% 1.6%
Bias -9% to 8% -5% to 5% -8% to 6% -11% to 9% -5% to 5%
Uniqueness ≈ 59/128 ≈ 64/128 ≈ 51/128 ≈ 44/128 ≈ 64/128
Randomness > 92% > 98% > 94% > 89% > 98%
hardware cost, bias, uniqueness, randomness, and stability are evaluated.
Chapter 3
PUF Design Optimization and Implementation
3.1 Introduction
Researchers have developed different types of PUFs since the concept was proposed [11,
16, 19, 20, 22]. Among those PUFs, RO PUF is a well-known type with typical perfor-
mance. Its architecture can be easily implemented on digital circuit. Therefore, in this
chapter, we focus on a practical RO PUF implementation on FPGAs. We optimize the
architecture of RO PUFs and show the details of implementing RO PUFs on FPGAs.
To improve the measurement accuracy of RO frequency, we use phase calibration pro-
cess for frequency estimation. Meanwhile, We also minimize hardware resources and
develop a flexible output data width. Furthermore, we explore the feature of instability




3.2 RO PUF Description and Properties
Problem Analysis
Few papers have discussed the impact of bias in RO PUF responses [14], which is
the favoring of RO PUFs to either 1 or 0. According to our tests, we found that the
counter design in the traditional RO PUF can contribute significantly to this bias. When
CounterA and CounterB hold the same value, the comparator must make an choice of
how to treat this case - in our example, the comparator puts this “equivalent” case in
the “smaller” group.. The “larger” group, on the other hand, can be active only when
CounterA receives more pulses than CounterB in the given clock cycles. Therefore,
the output contains more 0’s than 1’s. If ROs are placed more regularly, the frequencies
may end up being closer, thus causing more ”equivalent” cases. This is aggravated
especially when the counter size is limited. Regardless of the count cycles, the bias
caused by the counter design is still as high as 5.03%. As a result, the bit error rate
and the bias are intensified by the design fault and inaccurate measurement. Another
problem of this RO PUF design is the inefficient usage of hardware resources. To
generate just a single bit output, the design requires an log N-bit input and N oscillators.
Though we can apply a hash function to generate different challenges, its hardware
implementation requires even more FPGA slices than the PUF itself [24]. A transient
effect ring oscillator PUF was proposed with a good ratio of PUF response variability to
response length, but the intra-device variation increases to 1.7% [25], compared to [11]
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with 0.86% intra-device variation. In this chapter, we will discuss a practical phase
calibration technique to improve the quality of RO pairs comparison, which shows a
trade-off between the cost, stability, and flexibility.
3.2.1 RO PUF Design Improvement
Though RO PUFs have been heavily studied, there are still possibilities of improvement
particularly with respect to implementations on FPGAs. In this section, we will discuss
some practical RO PUF optimizations on the hardware.
Ring Oscillator Design on FPGAs
While PUFs have been primarily targeted towards ASIC designs, we explore their po-
tential on FPGAs. According to our test on the Kintex-7 FPGA [26], the frequency of
a 5-stage inverter chain RO is approximately 475 MHz when the system clock is 200
MHz. In the crossing timing domain between the ROs and PUF control logic circuit, a
high RO frequency adds to the instability of measurements. As with all oscillators, the
rate of oscillation is determined by the length of a delay implemented in a loop. Thus,
to reduce the frequency, more inverters can be added in the ROs, but it requires more
hardware resources. We provide an improved RO design that takes advantage of the
lookup tables (LUTs) of the configurable logic blocks (CLBs) and the general purpose
interconnect [27] in the FPGA. As shown in Figure 3.1, the first part consists of a 4-
LUT delay and a 1-LUT inverter. The reset signal is used to control the enable timing
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of all LUTs. In the second part, a single inverter in the loop implements a high gain
inverting amplifier. The output frequency is divided by 2 in order to eliminate output
glitches. This design only needs six LUTs and a D-type flip-flop (FD).
Fig. 3.1: An improved RO design for an FPGA
Shift Register and Hash Function for Resource Improvement
In order to generate variable length responses, we choose a design as shown in Fig-
ure 3.2. This example uses 128 ROs to provide 128-bit CRPs. Once a challenge is
received, it is stored in a shift register. We select the first 7 bits from the register as the
input of the upper decoder and MUX in order to select an RO from the array. Likewise,
another RO is selected using the next 7 bits from the challenge shift register. If the ad-
dresses are the same, the second 7-bit address is added by 1 to avoid selecting the same
RO for comparison. Next, we shift the challenge register to select a new RO pair. The
shift pattern can be complex for security consideration. To make it easy to understand,
we shift one bit to the left each time. If the challenge is 128 bits, we can generate a
128-bit response with 127 shift operations.
Alternatively, the shift register can be replaced by a non-cryptographic hash func-
tion. Compared to cryptographic hash function, which provides one-way, collision re-
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Fig. 3.2: Architecture of our RO PUF
sistant, and deterministic properties, non-cryptographic hash function is significantly
faster and low-cost. It is also easy to be implemented on FPGAs. Below is the algo-
rithm of ElfHash that we used in the PUF:
Timing Improvement
In the traditional design, metastability can exist at the input of the counters. It occurs
when the counters receive a clock rising edge for comparison. If the RO output happens
to flip when a counter value is changing, the result of comparison will be none of larger,
smaller, or equal, but a metastable state. We have verified this scenario on our FPGA
implementations. As a result, the instability of responses increases. Our solution is to
use two registers to store the counter values. The registers and counters are in the same
clock domain so that metastabilities are eliminated. The comparison result is recorded
in the response register as an output bit.
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4: count ← 0
5: loop 1:
6: hash← (h << 4) + challenge
7: challenge← challenge + 1
8: if x = hash and 0xF0000000 then
9: hash← hash xor (x >> 24)
10: hash← hash and (not x)
11: count ← count + 1
12: if count = 128 then goto loop 1.
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3.2.2 RO PUF Implementation on an FPGA
Few papers have clear descriptions on how the RO PUF is implemented on FPGAs [14,
28, 29]. Incorrect HDL coding can lead to logic unit rebuilding during synthesis,
which results in functionality failure. For example, inverters built with inv(1) <=
not inv(0); statements will be optimized out and cannot be placed as RO arrays.
LUT-based RO Placement
To implement the ring oscillators on FPGAs, we use the LUTs directly in our code and
add element placement constraints to fix the LUTs with certain delay. In our work, we
used the Vivado development kit and the Kintex-7 FPGA provided by Xilinx to show
the RO PUF implementation on FPGAs [26, 30]. In the Kintex-7, a CLB contains a pair
of slices, and each slice is composed of four 6-input LUTs and other elements [31]. By
setting the initial value to “01”, a 1-input LUT (LUT1) can perform the same function
as a digital inverter. An example of the traditional RO implementation is shown in
Figure 3.3. We place one LUT3 (3-input LUT) in the left slice and four LUT1’s in the
right slice. These five LUTs and the white connections form a basic RO. Apart from
the feedback input of another inverter, LUT3 also includes a reset input and an enable
input. The left LUTs in a CLB are reserved for other logic of the RO.
Figure 3.4 shows the RO placement given by Figure 3.1. Four delay LUT2s are
placed in the left slice and the invert LUT locates in the right slice. The output of the
first stage oscillator is connected to the FD, which builds another oscillator with another
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Fig. 3.3: LUT-based RO placement example
LUT2 in the right slice. Since the delay LUTs contain no logic, ‘keep’ attributes is
required in the design to stop logic optimization by the synthesis tool. Additionally, a
combinatorial loop in the FPGA is considered bad design practice in most cases, which
increases the number of cycles by infinitely going around the circle in the same path. To
avoid unnecessary errors during synthesis and bitstream generation, some constraints
are applied to let Vivado ignore these loops.
Fig. 3.4: Improved LUT-based RO placement example
RO Array Placement on FPGA
Figure 3.5 shows the manual placement of one RO PUF. To maintain the randomness
and uniqueness, all the timing critical FFs and LUTs must be placed carefully. 128 ROs
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are listed in six columns regularly in order to maximize the manufacturing differences
between PUFs. Between columns, two slices are reserved for the relevant logic between
ROs and the control unit. LUTs and FDs of the finite-state machine (FSM) are placed
at the bottom of the RO array. Other primitives with no effects on the performance are
placed by Vivado automatically.
Fig. 3.5: RO PUF manual placement overview
Automatic Constraints Generation
However, manual placement of PUFs can be very time-consuming. In our example,
each RO array contains 768 LUTs and 128 FFs. If the hardware specification is modi-
fied, it may lead to the reconstruction of the architecture. As a result, most of the cells
have to be placed again. To make it progress more efficient, we developed an automa-
tion code generation process in Figure 3.6. The hardware specification module defines
the length of CRPs, performance requirements, and usable platforms. The information
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is translated to acceptable format of Shell script so that the code generation script can
figure out the scale of RO array. With pre-defined templates, we are able to generate
the code and constraints automatically.
Fig. 3.6: RO PUF code generation
Manually Rounting Consideration
On the other hand, improper routing also affects the uniqueness of PUFs. Though our
LUT and FF placement fixes the RO routing path, the other parts are routed by Vivado
automatically. The critical paths are the RO array enable and the counter enable. If
the RO array enable has a long delay while the counter enable has a short delay, it
indicates that the timing to generate RO pulses is postponed and the counter is enabled
in advance. In consequence, the window for measurement may not match the RO output
well, which leads to potential issues of uniqueness and bias. To eliminate the effect of
expected delay, we adjust unsatisfied wire delay by changing paths manually in Vivado
implementation and saving it as constraints.
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Stability Analysis
A key metric of any PUF is its reliability. In order to evaluate the stability, we have
implemented three RO PUFs on the FPGA, which are based on Figure 3.2. We gen-
erated 100,000 random challenges and applied the challenge twice to each PUF. The
two responses for each PUF were compared and the Hamming distance between the
two responses were recorded. Ideally, there should be no difference between the two
responses because the challenge was the same and the Hamming distance should be
zero. Figure 3.7 shows the Hamming distance distribution for the three PUFs. Without
any error correction or fault tolerance methodology, there are about 10 bit errors in each
128-bit response. It is clear that a 7.81% bit error rate is unsatisfactory for authentica-
tion. Without very strong ECC, we will have a high false negative rate. To address the
instability of PUFs, we will introduce a phase calibration process in the next section.
























Fig. 3.7: Intra-PUF hamming distance without ECC
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3.3 Phase Calibrated PUF
Improving the stability of PUFs requires an accurate measurement of the RO frequency.
With the traditional RO PUF, theoretically, one could use a longer measurement time
to count RO pulses and thus improve the measurement accuracy.. However, we found
that extending the measurement time from 16 clock cycles to 512, in order to get larger
samples, had limited improvement on the stability. Since the ROs are not driven by the
system clock and each enable signal has its own delay, the output can be unstable when
the counter is enabled and disabled [12]. As a result, the count may be off by one or
two. Previously, we discussed adding a counter register to eliminate the unknown state,
it does not address the correctness due to instabilities at the boundaries of the measure-
ment cycle. Due to this unpredictable behavior, even though we tested some “stable”
RO pairs 1,000 times and got the same results every time, the next measurement might
still produce different value with a small probability. In this section, we propose an effi-
cient solution instead of the repeated testing, which can solve this problem with limited
cost.
3.3.1 Phase Calibration Process
Phase Calibration IP Core
The phase calibration process (PCP) is a critical part of our solution, which aims to
measure the frequency of ROs fast and accurately. The basic idea is to shift the phase
of the RO output signal in order to eliminate asynchronous timing measurement error.
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To implement it on FPGAs, we use a primitive that offers a programmable delay func-
tion, i.e. Xilinx provides an input delay resource called IDELAYE2 [32]. It can be
accessed directly from the FPGA logic and allows incoming signals to be delayed on
an individual input pin basis. Figure 3.8 shows the IDELAYE2 primitive, which offers
a variable delay mode that can control the delay value after configuration by manipu-
lating the control signals CE and INC. When CE goes High, the increment/decrement
operation begins on the next positive clock edge. The programmable delay taps in the
IDELAYE2 primitive wrap-around. When the last tap delay is reached (tap 31) a sub-
sequent increment function will return to tap 0. In Figure 3.8, a reset is detected (LD
is High) in the first clock event, causing the output DATAOUT to select tap 0 as the
output from the 31-tap chain. In the second clock event, a pulse on CE and INC is
captured on the rising edge of C. This indicates an increment operation. The output
changes without glitches from tap 0 to tap 1. In the third clock event, CE and INC are
no longer asserted, thus completing the increment operation. The output remains at tap
1 indefinitely until there is further activity on the LD, CE, or INC pins.
Fig. 3.8: Input delay resource and timing diagram
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Architecture of Phase Calibrated PUF
The architecture of our phase calibrated PUF (PCPUF) is shown in Figure 3.9. It mainly
consists of a 128-RO array, a control unit, a comparison unit, and pair of decoders,
MUXes, IDELAYE2s, and counters. The tap control is to control the delay of IDE-
LAYE2. Since PCP requires a strict RO enable timing, only one selected RO pair is
enabled in the measurement period. Otherwise, the control unit resets all the ROs.
Fig. 3.9: Architecture of PCPUF
PCPUF Algorithm
Algorithm 4 shows the details of the PCP. In order to generate a 1-bit response, the first
two 7-bit values of the challenge register are loaded to the register addr A and register
addr B. After checking the values, we reset CounterA and CounterB. The tap value
is loaded to IDELAYE2 primitives before being added by 1. By default, the tap value
is 0. When the delay is set, the control unit enables the selected RO pair and starts
testing. Each measurement takes 16 clock cycles. Then the tap value is added by 1 and
the new measurement starts. Between two measurements, the selected RO pair is kept
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disabled before the delay is set. When we complete the test from tap 0 to tap 31, a 1-bit
output is generated by comparing the counter values. Then the challenge register shifts
its value and launches the next response generation. Though the PCP slows down the
response generation comparing to the traditional RO PUFs, the PCPUF still keeps an
output speed of 625,000 bit/s.
3.3.2 Analysis of Phase Calibration Efficiency
Considering the calculable factors of FPGA, the accuracy of frequency estimation by
using the phase calibration process depends on the skew rate, threshold voltage, and
the relevant signal cycle. The skew rate and the threshold voltage determine the skew
between the system clock and the counters. When the control unit enables or disables
the counters at the beginning or in the end of the phase calibration process, the RO
outputs may be changing between the voltage thresholds, VOH min and VOL max. This may
lead to a metastable state of the counter value. According to the I/O buffer specification
(IBIS) model of the Kintex-7, if the FFs are in the same bank, the skew should be 50
ps to 100 ps. The internal signal voltage of the Kintex-7 is designed to swing between
-0.5 and 1.1 volts, with anything below 0.4 volts considered a ‘0’, and anything above
0.7 volts considered a ‘1’ [33, 34]. In the worst case, the metastability duration of each
rising edge or falling edge is 18.75 ps. Since the RO output phase at the beginning
of the window is unpredictable, we can calculate the probability of the metastability
occurrence in Figure 3.10 as
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4: reset CounterA, CounterB
5: load addr A, addr B
6: if addr A = addr B then addr B← addr A + 1
7: loop 2:
8: load tap to IDELAYE2
9: tap← tap + 1
10: enable RO(addr A),RO(addr B)
11: loop 3:
12: enable CounterA, CounterB
13: read RO(addr A),RO(addr B)
14: if count cycle < 16 then goto loop 3
15: keep CounterA, CounterB
16: disable RO(addr A),RO(addr B)
17: if tap < 32 then goto loop 2





23: goto loop 1.
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in which 4210 ps is the average RO cycle. Though the rising edge and falling edge
have the same probability, they are not independent events for any RO within one tap
delay. Now we focus on the entire process in Figure 3.10. We create a window of 16
system clock cycles (80 ns), within which the counters of the RO PUF become active.
Due to the wire delay, the selected RO pair may not be enabled at the same time. The
delay between each RO and the related counter depends on a tap ranging from 0 to
31. Since each taps of IDELAYE2 offers 78 ps delay in the normal environment, we
can have as much as 2.418 ns delay of the RO output, which is long enough to find
the metastability. Ideally, these 32 taps phase shift will not affect the RO frequency
measurement. However, some measurements show different counter values due to the
metastability. According to our simulation, one metastability occurrence at one edge
of the window has a probability of 0.00775. The probability that two metastability
occurrences at both edges of the window is 0.00113. There is no possibility of any
more unpredictable states as the window only has two edges. Thus the expected value
of metastability is
E[X] = 1 × 0.00775 + 2 × 0.00113 = 0.01116 (3.2)
Therefore, among the 32 taps shift cases, most of the counter values reflect the
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frequency of the selected RO correctly. The metastability only happens with a very low
possibility.
Fig. 3.10: PUF phase calibration timing
Apart from the calculable factors, measurement errors are also generated by the
noise margin, which is the amount by which the signal exceeds the threshold for a
proper ‘0’ or ‘1’. Being affected by the uncontrollable factors such as temperature,
voltage, and aging effects, we can hardly calculate the fault tolerate capability of phase
calibration process directly [35]. But we are able to obtain the probability of bit flipping
after PCP through large amounts of tests. Next we estimate the efficiency of PCP by
computing the intra-PUF hamming distance.
3.3.3 Estimation of Intra-PUF hamming Distance
The bit error rate is one of the most critical characteristic of PUFs. To estimate the
RBER of PCPUFs, we need to know the intra-PUF hamming distance first, which can
be calculated through the distributions of RO frequencies and bit flipping rate (BFR).
As we mentioned, when the frequencies of two ROs are closer, temperature, voltage,
and aging effects during operation lead to higher BFR. We begin with measuring the
rising edges of ROs in the unit time and show the probability distribution in Figure 3.11.
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The unit time is set to 80 ns (16 clock cycles). Since we add the measured data from
tap 0 to tap 31 and compute the average value, the results may not be integral. A fitting
Gaussian curve is generated according to the discrete data, which is used to provide an
ideal discrete distribution D( f ) for our computation.





















Fig. 3.11: Distribution of RO rising edges on average
We define a specific bit flipping rate λ according to the difference of the discrete
data. Marked as f1 and f2, the frequencies of two ROs determine the probability of bit
flipping. A measured λ(| f1− f2|) in Figure 3.12 shows the statistical BFR results, which
follows part of a normal distribution 3.61 × 108N(−12.99, 1.882). When two ROs have
a | f1 − f2| larger than 1, their output is very stable. However, the BFR increases sharply
when the difference range is less than 0.5. To further improve the reliability of PUFs,
these RO pairs can be blocked from the RO pair selection sets.
For any single bit, the probability of error occurrence can be computed as
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D( f1) × D( f2) × λ(| f1 − f2|) = 0.0029 (3.3)





0.0029n(1 − 0.0029)128−n (3.4)
According to Equation 6.5, the ideal intra-PUF hamming distance is shown in
Figure 3.13. Therefore, we can calculate the average number of errors, which is 0.3688
in a 128-bit response.
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Fig. 3.13: Expected Intra-PUF hamming distance
3.4 PCPUF Evaluation
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we present the measured data from six implemented PCPUFs on two
KC705 boards, as shown in Figure 6.5. The temperature of FPGAs is controlled at
30◦C according to the on-chip sensor and the voltage is 1.008V.
Fig. 3.14: PCPUF tests on KC705 boards
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3.4.2 Hardware Resource Utilization
Table 6.3 lists the post-implementation primitive utilization of the traditional RO PUF
and the optimized PCPUF. We exclude UART and FIFO module in the design to make
a fair evaluation. The overall utilization of our PCPUF are 0.58% of the look-up tables
and 0.05% of the flip-flops on the Kintex-7 FPGA. This is significantly low-cost com-
pared to the traditional RO PUF design. If we apply the architecture in Figure 2.1, only
35 arrays can be placed on a Kintex-7 FPGA, which means four FPGAs are required
to implement a 128-bit RO PUF. Since the shift register or hash function is used in the
design, only one array is needed to generate multi-bit responses.
3.4.3 Randomness
We applied 15 NIST randomness tests to evaluate the randomness of our PCPUF re-
sponses. The p-values and proportions are listed in Table 3.2. As the p-values are all
larger than 0.01, we accept the responses as random [36]. Though we use a pseudoran-
dom number generator to generate challenges, the proportions show that at least 98%
sequences pass the tests.
3.4.4 Uniqueness
The evaluation of the uniqueness of PCPUFs is shown in Figure 3.15, which compares
three groups of 100,000 128-bit responses. The responses are generated by download-
ing the same bitstream to two different Kintex-7 FPGAs. The fitting curves have a µ
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Table 3.1: FPGA Resource Usage of the Traditional RO PUF and the Optimized
PCPUF Implementations
Ref Name RO PUF PCPUF Functional Category
LUT1 514 2 LUT
LUT2 268 857 LUT
LUT3 175 55 LUT
LUT4 52 94 LUT
LUT5 273 30 LUT
LUT6 293 279 LUT
MUXF7 0 34 MuxFx
MUXF8 0 16 MuxFx
FDCE 20 16 Flop & Latch
FDRE 430 195 Flop & Latch
FDSE 1 1 Flop & Latch
CARRY4 7 9 CarryLogic
IBUF 4 4 IO
OBUF 2 2 IO
BUFG 1 1 Clock
IDELAYE2 0 2 IO
IDELAYECTRL 0 1 IO
Slice 647 365 CLB Slice
Utilization 1.26 0.71 %
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Table 3.2: Results of NIST Randomness Tests
Statistical Test P-value Proportion
frequency 0.066882 0.98972
block frequency 0.213309 0.98972
cumulative sums 0.534146 0.98978
runs 0.739918 0.99075
longest run 0.031497 0.98939
rank 0.219646 0.98988
FFT 0.392456 0.98991
non-overlapping template 0.122325 0.98940
overlapping template 0.062947 1.00000
universal 0.599114 1.00000
approximate entropy 0.637119 1.00000
random excursions 0.778616 0.98902
random excursions variant 0.137809 0.98905
serial 0.039329 0.99161
linear complexity 0.534146 1.00000
converging to 64 - thus, there are 50% bits flipped on average. Therefore, the responses
are unique. Moreover, we have compared the responses from six PUFs on two FPGAs
and they all follow a normal distribution.
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fitting curve
Fig. 3.15: Inter-PUF Hamming distance
3.4.5 Stability
As shown in Section 3.3, the average number of errors is 0.3688 in 128-bit responses,
which means the theoretical bit error rate is 0.29%. To verify that, we generated chal-
lenges with a pseudorandom number generator. Each challenge is used twice in order
to provide two responses for comparison. The test was repeated 100,000 times. Fig-
ure 3.16 shows the measured intra-PUF Hamming distance of our PCPUFs. Compared
to the corresponding results with no ECC and phase calibration in Figure 3.7, the fit-
ting curves for PCPUFs have obvious shift to the left and approach the ideal bound in
Figure 3.13.
Table 3.3 shows the average bit error rate of three shift register based RO PUFs
and six PCPUFs. Compared to RO PUFs, PCPUFs have obvious improvement on the
response stability. Though the bit error rates are higher than the ideal bound, all the
results are smaller than 1.00%. This is still acceptable if we take the measurement
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Fig. 3.16: Intra-PUF Hamming distance with phase calibration
errors into consideration. Since we do not apply ECC in our PUFs, the bit error rate
is low enough for authentication purposes. Within the temperature range of normal
testing environment, we observed no significant changes of the bit error rate.
Table 3.3: Bit Error Rate of RO PUFs and PCPUFs
FPGA 1 BER FPGA 1 BER FPGA 2 BER
RO PUF 1 7.10% PCPUF 1 0.54% PCPUF 1 0.37%
RO PUF 2 8.09% PCPUF 2 0.85% PCPUF 3 0.70%
RO PUF 3 7.13% PCPUF 3 0.62% PCPUF 2 0.91%
3.4.6 Bias
Ideally, there should be 50% 1’s and 50% 0’s in a response. However, our RO PUF
implementation on Kintex-7 FPGAs have a bias ranging from 41% to 58% according
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to our tests. As a comparison, we list the bias of PCPUFs in Table 3.4. Each result
is based on the mean of 100,000 128-bit responses. Without any post-processing, all
six PUFs produce bias within ±2% of ideal, which prove the effectiveness of the phase
calibration on improvement the RO PUF bias.
Table 3.4: Bias of RO PUFs and PCPUFs
FPGA 1 Bias FPGA 1 Bias FPGA 2 Bias
RO PUF 1 40.85% PCPUF 1 49.21% PCPUF 1 48.72%
RO PUF 2 47.10% PCPUF 2 49.77% PCPUF 3 51.08%
RO PUF 3 58.42% PCPUF 3 51.35% PCPUF 2 50.14%
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we demonstrated a practical design and implementation of RO PUFs on
FPGAs. The phase calibration process focuses on improving the frequency measure-
ment techniques in the crossing clock domain area. By involving phase calibration, the
7.81% bit error rate is reduced to less than 1%. We also evaluate other properties of
PCPUF, including randomness, uniquess, and bias.
Chapter 4
Secure Authentication Solution with PUF Response Instability
4.1 Introduction
Authentication is widely applied in the digital world, which poses special problems
with electronic communication and supply chain device identification. It has vulner-
abilities to man-in-the-middle attacks and counterfeiting. Previously we introduce a
stable PCPUF design. Based on that, we will discuss a specific authentication applica-
tion using the instability of PCPUF in this chapter. Unlike the normal usage of PUF
response, this work converts the unstable bits to the stable output. It is noted that the
method can be applied to other types of PUF as well. Furthermore, an obfuscation
system is provided to enhance the security of authentication solution, which also takes
advantage of the unstable response in PUFs.
4.2 Unstable-Stable Response
Modeling and machine learning attacks are well-known for PUF adversary. The suc-
cessful prediction is due to the accurate calculation and measurement of physical pa-
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rameters such as delay and frequency. To achieve a secure PUF-based solution against
those attacks, we propose a novel method to generate responses, which uses the insta-
bility of PUFs. Since the unstable bits in the RO PUF response are hard to be predicted,
they provides better security feature than the stable ones. However, those bits have been
only considered in the random number generation application yet. For other scenarios,
only stable bits are usually required. In our work, we find the possibility to transfer
the unstable bits to stable bits and apply them to PUF responses, which is present as
unstable-stable response (USR), a more stable and secure response.
USR Generation
Figure 4.1 shows how to generate USR with a PCPUF. We set another hash function
module out of the PCPUF, which can provide multiply sub-challenges with only one
challenge input. Once a sub-challenge is created, it is sent to the challenge register for
temporary storage. By reading the value from the register, PCPUF selects two RO pairs
and keeps outputting the 1-bit response to the first address of the unstable bit counter for
1,000 times. The accumulated value in the counter reflects the stability of this output.
A number that close to 0 or 1,000 is known to be stable while 500 is regarded as the
most unstable response. With the help of its internal hash function module, the model
generates a 128-bit raw response and stores it in the counter. Since PCPUFs provide
good stability in their responses, the obvious unstable bits are so limited that less than
one bit can be found in 128 bits. In the unstable bit counter, we set the unstable bits as
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‘1’ and stable ones as ‘0’. The counter records the number of ‘1’s and sends the 128 bits
to the response register. Before the bias reaches the ideal fifty-fifty, the counter enables
the hash function module in order to launch the next progress with a different internal
challenge. Another raw response is generated and transferred to a internal response in
the counter. We apply the bitwise OR operation to this internal response and the one
that stores in the response register. After updating the register value, the new response
should have a higher probability to contain more ‘1’s. By repeating the same process,
the response in the register reaches a balance between ‘1’ and ‘0’ finally. Now it is
ready to be served as the final response.
Fig. 4.1: Generating stable responses by using unstable raw responses
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Proof of Theoretical Threshold
Note that the current design cannot guarantee a static threshold of how many times the
process should be executed. The first reason is that the unstable bits selected by the
hash function module are not controllable. Secondly, the ‘1’s in two responses may be
overlapped. Thus, the amount of ‘1’ is reduced by the OR operation. To estimate the
threshold, we define u as the number of unstable bits in 128-bit internal response. The
probability that a certain bit is not set to ‘1’ in one process is 1 − u128 . Since there are t
loops, the probability that the bit is not set to ‘1’ by any loop is
p0 = (1 − u128)
t (4.1)
The probability that it is ‘1’ is therefore
p1 = 1 − (1 − u128)
t (4.2)





p164 p064 = 1 (4.3)
By solving the equation, we are able to set a reasonable threshold in order to control the
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bias. When the unstable bits is 0.5%, t is about 177. Though it is possible to control the
bias with a dynamic adjustment, the required logic resource will increase significantly.
USR-based Authentication
As a basic PUF application, authentication does not require very low bit error rate of
the PUF responses. Thus, we can apply our USRs directly to the solution. For the
simplest authentication, we compare two responses and check if the mismatched bits
are larger than a threshold t. In this application, false negative rate and false positive
rate are critical for performance evaluation. Given a bit error rate e in 128-bit USRs,













) ,m ≈ 1282 ∗ e (4.4)








(1 − p)n p128−n (4.5)
in which p is the probability of a random collision in 128 trials. Ideally, the value is
close to 0.5.
Apart from the accuracy, we also need to estimate the cost of this solution. One
important aspect is the utilization of memory space. In the simplest solution, we do
not require ECC as the bit error rate in USRs is very low. Thus, there is no additional
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overhead except the CRPs. Given the CRP length of n, the memory cost is 2n bits per
CRP. This is acceptable for small amounts of authentication requests. However, as the
requests grow, the memory cost increases linearly. A lightweight solution is to record
the instability information of PUFs instead of CRPs. The assumption is that we trust the
security of the database, which contains some sensitive information of PUFs. In that
case, we can calculate the USRs with the known hash function, instability RO pairs,
and the corresponding challenges.
As we mentioned above, an effective solution is based on the assumption that
the database is secure. However, we must consider the scenario that the information
is disclosed to attackers. The typical solution is to encrypt the database. Alternatively,
we can choose a solution that combines the ECC and Bloom filter [37], which is both
secure and efficient.
4.3 Obfuscation-based Authentication
Since some authentication applications require higher security level, we provide an-
other scheme for our PUFs with a strong obfuscation. Our prime goal is that even if a
current response is disclosed, it does not leak non-negligible information about the next
responses with the same challenge, which means attackers cannot use replay attack to
pass the authentication when a repeated challenge is applied. Secondly, the scheme has
strong modeling attack resistance by involving unstable bits in the responses, but the
authentication accuracy will not be affected in the database. Furthermore, though probe
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attacks can obtain the information, the final response is still unpredictable.
Obfuscation Architecture and Algorithm
The scheme starts from the N-bit challenge register in Figure 4.2. Before launching the
challenges, a PCPUF stability model is created in the hardware memory. It records the
stable RO pairs and unstable ones. After a challenge is received from the database, the
register value will not be updated until the final response is generated. In the first loop,
the challenge is hashed by a one-way hash function module with an initial seed. The
hash value is sent to the secure address generator as a secure challenge. By mapping
the generated addresses to the PCPUF stability model, we select N − 1 stable bits and
one very unstable RO pair. We enable the unstable RO pair in order to generate 1-bit
output for obfuscation. The position of the inserted unstable bit depends on the hash
value. The N-bit temporary response is saved in RegisterA. Then we apply exclusive
or operation to the value between the RegisterA and RegisterB, and store the result in
RegisterB. In the first loop, the values in RegisterB is 0 as it is reset along with a new
challenge. Since the secure address generator knows the selected N −1 stable bits, they
are sent to the one-way hash function module and hashed as the secure challenge of the
second loop. Before the hash operation, 1-bit ‘0’ is added to the end of the stable bits
to ensure that the input length is N-bit. This process repeats T times to generate the
final response. In the loop t, the secure address generator still select N − 1 stable bits
and one unstable RO pair, which is stored in RegisterA. But there are t accumulated
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unstable bits in RegisterB, given the different inserted positions by the secure address
generator. Thus, the final response contains T unstable bits.
Fig. 4.2: Secure obfuscation-based authentication solution
To check the collision, we involve a Bloom filter and its reset control logic mod-
ule in our scheme. A Bloom filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that
is used to test whether an element is a member of a set. With an obfuscation bit mask
from the secure address generator, the N − T stable bits are sent from RegisterB to the
Bloom filter. After being added by T -bit ‘0’s, the string is hashed by k hash functions
and the hashed values are stored in a M-bit non-volatile memory (NVM) Bloom filter.
The NVM should be tamper resistant against any malicious reset. Whenever a final
response is generated, we check the Bloom filter first to ensure that the response has
never been released before. If there is no collision, we update the Bloom Filter with the
k hash values and output RegisterB as the final response. However, Once a collision
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is found, the final response will be stalled in RegisterB. As a further obfuscation, we
rerun this process for T times to generate a new response. However, this time we switch
the hash function input to the entire RegisterA, which means the unstable bit is included
in the one-way hash input. After T loops, the final response will hardly disclose any
information of the PUF state and pattern.
Due to memory space limitation, it is not possible to store infinite hash values
in the NVM. Therefore, we use a reset control logic to cleanup the Bloom Filter when
the false positive reaches a preset threshold. According to our scheme, the PUF is
not allowed to generate the same response twice within the threshold times. Modeling
attacks are also inefficient as stable response bits and internal state is obfuscated by
the unstable bits, one-way hash function, and the Bloom filter. Even if the Bloom
filter is reset, the pattern cannot be detected due to the T times one-way hashing. The
complexity of our scheme also makes probe attacks useless since the next final response
is unpredictable given a known PCPUF model, Bloom filter content, and the current
register value. Since the attackers cannot try all 2N input patterns when N is large, our
scheme is secure.
Database Consideration
To authenticate our PUFs in a secure way, we avoid recording any data in the database
that may disclose the information of the PUFs. Instead, we use Bloom filters for authen-
tication, in which the hash functions provide strong resistance against software reverse
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Algorithm 3 Secure authentication scheme
1: procedure Obfuscation
2: loop 1:
3: reset RegisterB, t
4: ChallengeRegister ← new challenge
5: loop 2:
6: if t = 1 then hash(new challenge(N))
7: else if t = T + 1 & no collision then goto loop 3
8: else if t = T + 1 & collision then output RegisterB goto wait
9: else if no collision then hash(RegisterA(N − 1)+‘0’)
10: else if collision then hash(RegisterA(N))
11: generate N − 1 stable bits with the PCPUF model
12: generate 1 unstable RO pair with the PCPUF model
13: generate 1 obfuscation bit with the RO array
14: generate inserted position with the hash value
15: RegisterA← N bits
16: RegisterB← RegisterA ⊕ RegisterB
17: t ← t + 1
18: goto loop 2
19: loop 3:
20: receive ob f uscation bit mask
21: BloomFilter ← RegisterB(N − T ) + T ‘0’
22: if collision then t ← 1 goto loop 2
23: else if no collision then update BloomFilter output RegisterB goto loop 1
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engineering. When a PUF is manufactured, we test the PUF and store the PCPUF
stability model to the database. Then we redo the response generation process by soft-
ware, with our challenge set and the known initial seed in the PUF. Since we cannot
predict the unstable bits in the response, all the possibilities must be generated by an
authentication tree, as shown in Figure 4.3. The responses of R1 are generated after the
first loop of calculations according to the challenge C1. R1(0) and R1(1) are based on
the assumption that the obfuscating unstable bit is ‘0’ and ‘1’. In the second loop, the
responses of R2 are generated with the N − 1 stable bits from R1 and the unstable bits
lead to four combinations. By following this progress, we obtain 2T possibilities of the
final response. With the same challenge C1, the final response of this PUF must belong
to the set of RT . Thus, all the responses in this set need to be recorded in the Bloom
filter with C1 as one-time CRP. As we apply NONCE to the challenge set, it is not nec-
essary to calculate and store the final response set of the second T loop. By mapping
the response set with one-way hash functions, we can guarantee the data security in the
database.
This security scheme sacrifices hardware resources however. For instance, after
generating 1 million responses, the Bloom filter will be reset to maintain a false positive
of 10−6. The size of NVM and the number of hash functions are calculated as:
M = − n ln p
(ln 2)2
≈ 3.42 MB (4.6)
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ln 2 ≈ 20 (4.7)
In the database, the false positive rate of the Bloom filter affects the authentication
accuracy. Thus, it needs to be much lower than that in the PUF. If we set it to 10−20, the
size of Bloom filter for 1 million CRPs is:
M′ = − n ln p
(ln 2)2
≈ 11.43 MB (4.8)
Obviously, the cost is higher than the USR-based authentication solution. In summary,
there is always a trade-off between the cost and the security. Those low-cost solutions
are suitable for a large amount of chips while this scheme enhances the security level
for some critical applications.
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4.4 Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 USR Authentication Result
The performance of USR-based authentication is shown in Table 4.1. Compared to the
measured raw response of PCPUFs, USRs have lower bit error rate. When we set the
threshold to 20, all three PCPUFs have a low false positive and false negative rate in
theory. We also verify the bound by measuring 300,000 CRPs on an FPGA. The results
show that no false positive or false negative is detected.
Table 4.1: False Positive and False Negative of USR-based Authentication
FPGA 1 BER t False positive False negative
PCPUF 1 0.30% 20 4.30 × 10−16 5.38 × 10−22%
PCPUF 2 0.38% 20 4.30 × 10−16 1.41 × 10−19%
PCPUF 3 0.31% 20 4.30 × 10−16 8.82 × 10−22%
4.4.2 Comparison with ECC Solutions
Table 4.2 shows the other authentication solutions with Hamming ECC and BCH ECC.
Hamming(255,247) can correct one bit error in 128-bit responses while BCH(255,128,15)
has a correct capability of as many as 15. However, the overhead of BCH ECC is much
larger than that of Hamming ECC. We apply both ECCs to the shift register based RO
PUFs and our PCPUFs. Compared to the poor performance on RO PUFs, a lower bit
error rate of PCPUFs takes more advantages from ECCs. When those 100,000 CRPs
59
are tested with BCH ECC, no false negative is detected. Though it is hard to estimate
the accurate false negative of BCH ECC based authentication on PCPUFs, we can com-
pare the overhead of these solutions in order to find a better trade-off. The codeword
of BCH ECC is almost the same size as the key, while our USR-based solution has no
additional overhead at all. Therefore, USR-based authentication is recommended when
the memory space becomes a critical bottleneck.
Table 4.2: Performance of ECC-based Authentications
PUF type ECC type overhead False negative
RO PUF 1 Hamming(255,247) 8 1
RO PUF 2 Hamming(255,247) 8 1
RO PUF 3 Hamming(255,247) 8 1
RO PUF 1 BCH(255,128,15) 116 3.82 × 10−2
RO PUF 2 BCH(255,128,15) 116 4.84 × 10−2
RO PUF 3 BCH(255,128,15) 116 2.21 × 10−2
PCPUF 1 Hamming(255,247) 8 1.21 × 10−2
PCPUF 2 Hamming(255,247) 8 2.10 × 10−2
PCPUF 3 Hamming(255,247) 8 1.59 × 10−2
PCPUF 1 BCH(255,128,15) 116 < 10−6
PCPUF 2 BCH(255,128,15) 116 < 10−6
PCPUF 3 BCH(255,128,15) 116 < 10−6
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4.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we demonstrated the potential of using instability of PUF responses
as stable output. The unstable-stable response method transfers unstable bits to stable
output. The results show that USR has better performance than the traditional ECC so-
lutions. Another contribution is the obfuscation design of PUF responses. By applying
the unstable RO pairs as stable responses and obfuscation, we improved the stability
and security of PCPUF-based authentication.
Chapter 5
Ring Weight Algorithm for Lightweight Authentication
5.1 Introduction
As the integrated circuit industry grows, counterfeiting ICs have also been growing as
an illegal means of profit taking. In response to this trend, authenticating untrusted
ICs has become a critical and pressing issue. Many methods are already available to
identify and authenticate ICs [38]. Among them, solutions based on PUFs show the
high level of security due to their unpredictable response [1].
The high bit error rate in the responses of PUFs requires strong error correcting
codes (ECC) to guarantee a low false negative rate in authentication processes [39].
However, a strong ECC requires large memory space and high calculation complexity.
Fuzzy extractor is another solution with higher security level apart from ECC, which
involves even larger overhead [8, 40]. As a result, it causes a trade-off between the
failure rate and the overhead. Though it is necessary to apply traditional ECC or fuzzy
extractor when using PUFs as key generation purpose, IC authentication process does
not need to correct the errors in responses, but tolerate them.
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In this chapter, we propose a novel algorithm that not only keeps false positive
and false negative small, but also reduces the overhead and computation time. This
algorithm calculates the density of 128 bits distribution in a response and selects cer-
tain information for authentication. By tolerating the weight and location shift of these
values, errors in responses affect the accurate rate negligibly. Additionally, the en-
crypted helper data from each chip improves the performance in a practical and secure
way. Thus, a larger set can effectively prevent cloned chips from colliding and being
authenticated by mistake.
5.2 System Architecture
Figure 5.1 shows an on-board self-authentication architecture where IC PUFs can be
authenticated on the board itself. The system is composed of an authentication de-
vice that can issue challenges and receive responses from an IC PUF and a database
where the challenge and response pairs are stored. In addition, the data generated by
the reliable responses can be sent to the memory for offline usage. In the figure, the
authentication device is shown as a FPGA device, but could be implemented with any
trusted device with compute capabilities as well. For self-authentication, the database
should be stored on the board in some type of nonvolatile memory. If authentication
is done offline, the database is stored in a secure server. The database is a critical part
of the authentication process and it suffers from three problems – namely size, error
tolerance, and security. The size of this database can be a critical issue as it needs to
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store all challenge response pairs and the on-board storage may be limited. Since most
current PUFs are not reliable – i.e., there is the possibility of bit errors, and we assume
that the IC PUF has no built-in error correction, the authentication device and database
must handle any errors in the response. Finally, security is a prime concern, because if
the database is compromised, attackers can easily obtain the CRPs from the database
and clone the chip with faked responses of PUFs.
We show three different approaches to address these issues – standard error cor-
rection with encryption, error correction with Bloom filter, and fault tolerant extremum
matching. Depending on the approach, the data stored in the database will differ.
Fig. 5.1: The architecture of three IC authenticating solutions
5.2.1 Error Correcting and Bit Matching
The simple solution is to store CRPs and ECC code words in the database for authenti-
cation. Since the responses from the PUFs may contain a number of bit errors [41, 42],
a strong ECC is required to guarantee a low false negative rate. However, this approach
requires a larger database in order to hold the ECC code words. Moreover, it requires
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encryption of the database which entails more computation effort as well as the diffi-
culty of managing the encryption key.
5.2.2 Error Correcting/Bloom Filter Matching
In order to deal with the size of the database, one could use one of a number of loss-
less compression techniques. However, the database must be uncompressed eventually,
meaning, while nonvolatile memory is reduced, the volatile memory must still be large
enough to store the CRPs and ECC code words. Instead, for our application, we need a
compressed data structure that can be queried without uncompression. A Bloom Filter
is such a data structure: a space-efficient probabilistic data structure that can be used to
test if an element is a member of a set [43]. The answer to this query can be either “pos-
sibly in set” or “definitely not in set”, which means it can have false positives but never
false negatives. A Bloom filter is a bit array with k different hash functions. Feeding
an element to these k hash functions produces k array positions which can be set to 1.
Querying for an element requires feeding it to the k hash functions and verifying that
the resulting bit positions are set to 1. Thus, it provides faster detection of information
without resorting to associative lookup buffers [44, 45]. To enhance the information
security, one-way hash functions can be used instead [46]. Due to the one-way hash
functions, it is computationally hard for attackers to retrieve original responses from the
Bloom filter array and code words. In the context of IC/PUF authentication, a Bloom
filter can be used to store the challenge-response pairs. As a result, the database is
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composed of challenges, ECC code words, and the Bloom filter. While the Bloom filter
reduces the size of the database significantly by reducing the size of the response space,
the need to store ECC code words still requires a large dataset.
Consider a Bloom filter with a size of m bits and k hash functions. If n is the
number of elements to be stored in the filter, the false positive rate, p f , can be calculated
as approximately [47]
p f = (1 − e −knm )k (5.1)
For a given n and a desired p f , the optimal m and k can be calculated by the following
equations:







As an example with n = 106, a 28755176-bit array and 20 hash functions are required
to keep the false positive rate below 10−6.
This solution calls for a strong BCH ECC due to the high bit error rate in re-
sponses [48]. On the other hand, it sacrifices time and memory space efficiency. For
instance, to correct 12 errors in a 128-bit response, eight dimensions of Galois Field
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and 92-bit code word are required, which means large overhead and long-time encod-
ing and decoding. Further, if errors are more than the limitation of error correcting
capacity, false negatives will occur due to the failure of error correcting and the false
mappings into the Bloom filter.
5.2.3 Fault Tolerant Extremum Matching
The ideal solution is to use a strong input fault-tolerant matching algorithm to replace
ECC. The fault-tolerant array stores limited information such that even if the array is
disclosed, the responses are not available. The algorithm should be efficient while the
security level remains high. The overhead should be small while the false positive and
false negative are low. This algorithm is the main contribution of this chapter and is
described in further details in the next section.
5.3 Novel Fault Tolerant Methodology
To avoid the large overhead of using ECC, we propose a novel fault tolerant authenti-
cating scheme, which does not rely on ECC. It can achieve a better trade-off between
false positive rates, false negative rates, the computing time and the memory and area
overhead.
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5.3.1 Ring Weight Algorithm
The ring weight algorithm (RWA) [37] implements a similar function as the Bloom
filter plus ECC, but it requires very limited overhead for large input-fault-tolerance ca-
pabilities. We assume a 128-bit response is separated into 32 groups, which form an
outer ring as shown in Figure 5.2. Each group contains a 4-bit value ranging from 0
to 15 and is marked with a location value by sequential order. According to our sim-
ulation results in Table 5.1, we select 4-bit groups as a trade-off among false positive,
false negative, and overhead bits (maximum weight plus maximum location). The 32
location values compose the middle ring. The inner ring contains 32 weights ranging
from 10 to 0. Each weight is used only by the corresponding 4-bit group. If these
weights are not well-assigned, it will affect the authentication accuracy. Thus, we test
linear and non-linear weight distributions and select the optimal assignment according
to our simulation results. The overall weight of a location is calculated by multiplying
each 4-bit value by the current weight value aligned with it and taking the sum. Clearly,
the range of the overall weight is from 0 to 1800, since a response can be set from all
0’s to all 1’s. Figure 5.2 shows the ring in the 1st location and has an overall weight
of 849. This overall weight is computed by 10 × 10(1010) + 9 × 5(0101) + ... + 0 ×
11(1011) + ...+ 9× 7(0111) and is recorded in the first location of the middle ring. The
same process is done for every position as we rotate the weight dial clockwise for the
next number. Thus, in the second rotated position, the second 4-bit value (0101) now
is aligned with the weight of 10. We follow the previous rules to compute the overall
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weight: 10×5(0101)+9×5(0101)+...+0×15(1111)+...+9×10(1010). The new overall
weight value is recorded in the second location of the middle ring. After rotating the
weight dial 360 degrees, we can obtain 32 overall weights, among which the maximum
and minimum value are recorded as the peak and valley value of the response. The
corresponding peak and valley weight ring locations are also stored in the fault tolerant
array as a criterion for judgment.
Table 5.1: Performance of Different Bit Group Selection
scheme false positive false negative overhead bits
1-bit 31.95% 11.68% 15 + 7
2-bit 33.68% 10.84% 13 + 6
4-bit 35.72% 9.80% 11 + 5
8-bit 51.68% 5.05% 9 + 4
16-bit 74.56% 1.97% 7 + 3
A simple authentication method is to calculate the peak or valley information of a
response and compare it with that in the fault tolerant array. As the errors increase, the
overall weight and location value may not be fitted perfectly to the offline array value.
Thus, the shifting of the location and weight value should be tolerated to some certain
extents. By way of illustration, the offline recorded peak weight is 1138 and the related
location is 17. However, the results calculated from the response turn out to be 1105 and
16 due to several bit errors. In this case, the response is rejected, and the device cannot
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Fig. 5.2: Main structure of ring weight algorithm
pass the authentication process. In order to allow for errors, we can set a tolerance
threshold where we accept deviations in the weight and location value. For example,
if ±50 or ±1 are set as the acceptable tolerant range for weight or location value, the
response can still be authenticated correctly by weight-tolerance or location-tolerance.
However, allowing for tolerance thresholds introduces the possibility of false positives
- i.e. responses that are authenticated even though they were not valid. For example,
1105 and 16 could be the weight and location calculated from an invalid response rather
than due to errors in a valid response. Reducing the tolerance threshold ranges can
reduce the incidence of false positives, but that would increase the probability of false
negatives - i.e. responses that are rejected even though they were authentic. Thus, the
tension is coming up with optimal values of ranges to minimize both false positives and
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false negatives. In the following section, we discuss some of the theoretical foundations
behind calculating false positive and false negative rates.
5.3.2 False Positive and False Negative
In this section, we provide the relationship between the parameters of RWA and the au-
thentication results. In RWA, there are two parameters for fault tolerance usage: weight
and location. The maximum and the minimum values can be used for authentication.
In the aspect of the performance, false positive and false negative are the main factors
of authentication process. Thus, three groups of choices generate eight combinations
of simple authentication method.
Weight-based False Positive
We start the proof with the relationship between the maximum weight and the prob-
ability of false positive. Figure 5.2 shows a weight pattern ranging from 0 to 1800.
{W1, . . . ,Wn} is a set that records the maximum weight values of non-error responses.
For random distributed responses, the probability density function (PDF) of weight be-
longs to a certain family of distribution with a vector W ′. The measurement error is
given as W −W ′. Thus, the likelihood function of the joint probability is
L(W ′) = L(W ′; W1, . . . ,Wn) = f (W1 −W ′) · · · f (Wn −W ′) (5.4)
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Maximum-likelihood estimation is applied as





f ′(Wi −W ′)
f (Wi −W ′) =
n∑
i=1
g(Wi −W ′) = 0 (5.5)




(wi × (23rn + 22rn−1 + 21rn−2 + 20rn−3)), n = 4i (5.6)
If W is the arithmetic mean value of W, for the equation (5.6), with n = 2, then
g(W1 −W) + g(W2 −W) = 0 (5.7)
Since the minuend is the arithmetic mean of W1 and W2, the function can be simplified
as g(−W) = −g(W). Further, let W1 = . . . = Wm = −W, Wm+1 = mW, in which
n = m + 1. An arithmetic mean value of 0 leads to
n∑
i=1
g(Wi −W) = mg(−W) + g(mW) = 0 (5.8)
Thus, we have g(mW) = mg(W). The only continuous function that satisfies this equa-
tion is g(W) = cW, which means the PDF of W is
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f (W) = aec(W)
2
(5.9)








Therefore, the maximum weight follows a normal distribution. To estimate σ
and µ, we ran one million CRPs as a sample set. The bits in these responses are dis-
tributed uniformly to guarantee the accuracy. The simulated data with a fitted curve are
shown in Figure 5.3. Since the normal distribution curve achieves 0.999 adjusted R-
square with the simulation result, we can safely say that it represents how the maximum
weight values distribute from 0 to 1800. The parameters of the normal distributions are
represented as N(1008, 1062). In another words, the probability of maximum weight
can be applied to that of any random 128-bit response.
To calculate the maximum weight-based false positive, we apply convolution to
the curve in Figure 5.3. The convolution represents the collision rate between an invalid
response and the actual valid response. The process is shown in Figure 5.4. The blue
curve, representing the invalid response, starts shifting from the left side when µblue −
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Fig. 5.3: The maximum weight distribution of RWA
µred = −1800. At this point, the shaded area is equal to the probability of a collision
with a value of ∆Wmax = −1800. As the blue curve shifts closer to the red curve, the
shaded area increases as a smaller ∆Wmax has a higher probability of collisions. After
reaching the peak point ∆Wmax = 0, the probability decreases in a symmetrical way.
The results of the convolution are shown in Figure 5.5. The figure also shows the result
of a simulation of one million CRPs and one million random responses. As can be
seen, the simulated values of ∆Wmax are matched with the convolution data. Clearly, if
we tolerate a wider range of ∆Wmax, the integral and thus, the false positive probability
is higher. For example, if the tolerant range is 0, the false positive rate is 0.027. It
increases to 0.769 with an interval between −180 to 180 in Figure 5.6. A tolerant range
between −500 to 500 covers most collisions, but also means the probability of a false
positive is nearly 1. Thus, the tolerance setting need to be controlled in a reasonable
range in order to remain effective at keeping both the false positive and false negative
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rates small.












Fig. 5.4: Convolution of the maximum weight distribution



















Fig. 5.5: Collision of the maximum weight difference value
The above proof can also be applied to minimum weight-based false positive.
The curves in Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.7 show axial symmetry properties with the axis of
W = 900. In Figure 5.8, the convolution results match the simulated minimum weight
difference. Therefore, minimum weight-based tolerance has the equivalent collision
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Fig. 5.6: Probability of the maximum weight based false positive
rate as that of the maximum weight-based tolerance.





















Fig. 5.7: The minimum weight distribution of RWA
Location-based False Positive
As we mentioned in the RWA section, the peak location Lmax refers to the maximum
location while the valley location Lmin refers to the minimum location. Since they can
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Fig. 5.8: Collision of the minimum weight difference value
be proved to have similarly effects on location collisions, only the peak location-based
false positive is discussed in this section. This authentication is based on tolerating
∆Lmax caused by the bit errors in responses, but it involves false positive as well. The
collisions of ∆Lmax are caused by uncertain locations of random responses. In Fig-
ure 5.9, we present the relationship between ∆Lmax and the collision rate. Since we
define Lmax as {1, 2, . . . , 32}, ∆Lmax has an interval of [−31, 31]. With a fixed original
location, the tested response has an equal chance to appear at any place in the ring.
Thus, all the accessible locations are marked with the same probability unit ′1′ while
all the unavailable locations are ′0′. The collision rate can be calculated according to
the amount of ′1′ in the shape of diamond in the diagram. The position of ∆Lmax = 0
obtains the highest p: 32 out of 1024. On its both sides, there are progressive decreases
in probabilities. ∆Lmax = −31 and ∆Lmax = 31 only appear when Lmax is 1 and 32. A
comparison of the location collision is shown in Figure 5.10. We simulated one million
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CRPs and generated a collision rate set, which overlapped the theoretical probabilities
according to Figure 5.9.
Fig. 5.9: Distribution of the maximum location difference



















Fig. 5.10: Collision of the maximum location difference value
Notice that in the ring, ∆Lmax follows a rule: −31 = 1, −30 = 2, . . . , −16 =
16, . . . , −2 = 30, −1 = 31. Thus, in Figure 5.10, the triangle from −31 to −16
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can be flipped horizontally to the space from 1 to 16. The triangle from 17 to 31
can be flipped horizontally to the space from −15 to −1. As shown in Figure 5.11,
by transferring ∆Lmax into absolute value, the collision rate of location-based RWA
becomes flat from −15 to 16. When tolerating one more location with the current
location range, the collision rate increases by 1/32. To reduce the false positive, we
will discuss an optimization in the location shift scheme section.
Fig. 5.11: Absolute value of the maximum location difference
Weight-based False Negative





bit distribution patterns. In other words, we need to run the program for 8.07 × 1054
times to calculate the true probability of weight-based false negatives. Instead, we
estimate the probability by simulating one thousand samples to evaluate the distribution
of ∆Wmax. Each sample is a set of one million simulation results. One set refers to
one certain response with average 12 bit errors, but the error is distributed in different
patterns. Here, the number of errors is assumed to follow a normal distribution. The
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examples are given in Figure 5.12. If a response is all ′0′, it will only have negative
∆Wmax. A response with all ′1′ shows opposite features. However, most of the random
responses fit a standard normal distribution with µ = 0. All the sets together form
a normal distribution in Figure 5.13. We can safely claim that, though it is difficult
to calculate all the probabilities of weight-based false negatives, the results from the
samples have statistical significance and can be regarded as a close approximation of
the true probabilities. The simulated data matches the statistical curve in Figure 5.13.
Most of the error cases can be tolerated with a ∆Wmax between −275 to 275. The range
is determined mainly by the number of errors, as shown in Figure 5.14. With more
errors, the standard deviation, σ, becomes larger and the probability is less concentrated
around 0. Thus, a wider ∆Wmin threshold must be applied to reduce the false negative
rate. The minimum weight based false negative shows the same result, thus we skip
this discussion.




















Fig. 5.12: ∆W distribution for certain responses with random 12 bit errors
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Fig. 5.13: Tolerant capabilities of the maximum weight difference value










Fig. 5.14: Relationship between error number and σ
Location-based False Negative
As with the weight-based fault-tolerance scheme, determining the location-based false
negative rate is also a hard problem that cannot be solved in the polynomial time. There-
fore, we provide the statistical results in Figure 5.15 instead. The results contain seven
groups of simulations with different errors in responses. Again, the number of errors
follows a normal distribution. In each group, ten millions authentication processes with
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different response patterns are simulated. We calculate the average values to evaluate
the probability of |∆Lmax|. To simplify the problem, we use the absolute values of the
location difference. With a limited interval from −15 to 16, the results are more easily
affected by the errors. Thus, the curve shows different features compared to the normal
distribution. Meanwhile, the shapes of the curves are also determined by the weight
distribution in the ring. If the weight values in the ring are given in a linear way, the
curve shows a continuous feature. Otherwise, it is stepped. Compared to the curve
of 4 bit errors, groups with more errors have higher level of randomness in distribu-
tion. Clearly, when there are 64 bits flipped in a 128-bit response, it cannot keep its
own feature any more. Therefore, the curve with 64 bit errors is as flat as an uniform
distribution.






















Fig. 5.15: Relationship between error number and |∆Lmax|
One way to improve the performance of the algorithm is to use logic operations of
both location-tolerance and weight-tolerance. The intersection of location and weight
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set can decrease false negatives but increase false positives. Contrarily, the union of
location and weight set decreases the false positive rate but increases the false negative
rate. The combination of the peak and valley values plays similar function. As the error
rate grows, wider ranges of location and weight value are necessary to keep a low false
negative. However, a larger set of values sacrifices the false positive for tolerating more
bit errors. In a case that each 128-bit response of PUFs contains 12 random errors, a
pure fault tolerant algorithm with very limited overhead cannot keep both false positive
and false negative very low in theory. Thus, while false negative is required to be as
low as possible, how to avoid the increasing of false positive becomes a critical issue.
5.3.3 Location Shift Scheme
Since fault tolerance is involved in the algorithm, false positive becomes an ineluctable
problem for consideration. To decrease false positives, a location shift scheme is pro-
posed. This scheme requires an ID set of at least 32 bits in unauthenticated chips. As
shown in Figure 5.16, the low 20 bits record a serial number, which is the basic address
of the fault tolerant array. Since we simulate one million chips, it requires at least 20
bits to generate unique IDs. The high 8 bits represent a random number that relates to
the offset of the location. The middle 4 bits are encryption bits for data transfer security
consideration. When a chip receives a challenge from authenticating system, the 32-bit
ID will not be sent to the system until the response is generated. To transfer data se-
curely, the 128-bit response and 32-bit ID are mixed together logically. Certain bits of
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the basic address are flipped according to different 4-bit code word patterns. The 8-bit
offset address is also encrypted with an 8-bit challenge by XOR operation. Specially,
the eight bits of the challenge are selected by the quotient of the serial number divi-
sion. When the 160-bit data are received by the authentication system, encrypted basic
address, code word, encrypted offset address, and response are extracted according to
our defined protocol. After receiving the response, ring weight module generates four
values: peak weight, peak location, valley weight, and valley location. The locations
are further shifted by offset address in order to extend the matching space to the original
location value plus the offset value. Meanwhile, four values calculated in advance in
the fault tolerant array are selected by the decrypted basic address and are sent to the
comparator for authentication.
By adding the offset values, the original locations are extended from 32 to 256.
Therefore, it is harder for a cloned chip with a faked ID to point to the correct location.
Since the collision probability of locations is reduced, the false positive decreases as a
consequence. In Figure 5.16, the offset values added to the peak and valley location are
different because the valley location shift method uses revered offset bits, which can
further increase the difficulty of the collisions. Another effective way to decrease the
false positive is to extend the offset address. When the random bits in the ID are 11 bits,






The variable s is the location shift space. The original false positive is reduced
significantly with a set of s between 256 and 2048. Hence, increasing the shift space
makes random responses of a cloned PUF harder to find the correct peak and valley
location and pass the authentication test. However, expanding the shift space destroys
the ring architecture of ∆L. The original ring is cut and extended to a line, which
means the ±16 becomes ±32. The distribution of location-tolerance will not follow the
theoretical equations any more.
5.3.4 Security Consideration
Apart from the accuracy rate, security is another important issue for authentication. The
underlying PUF is still susceptible to potential modeling/ML attacks and RWA is not
designed to address such issues in the PUF. Moreover, commercially it is not feasible
for attackers to build many models since our focus is on authenticating a large amount
of chips. However, an attacker could potentially generate a response that matches the
RWA weight or location values. If we only use one simple RWA, it is not difficult to
get two random responses with the same value. RWA has two thresholds related to
collisions: tmaxlocation and tmaxweight. The maximum location of RWA leads to a uniform
distribution, as all the results lies evenly in 32 buckets. Here we apply the birthday
paradox to evaluate the difficulty in finding a response that passes the maximum loca-
tion threshold. As adapted from an argument of Paul Halmos, the probability that no
two ∆Lmax coincide is:
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(e−k/32) = e−(n(n−1))/(2×32) (5.12)
The above expression shows the interest in which the lower bound of a collision
occurs when p(n) > 1/2, thus the inequality implies p(n) < 1/2. Solving for n gives:
n2 − n > 2 × 32 ln 2 (5.13)
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This inequality is satisfied when n = 8. Therefore, 8 responses suffice for en-
suring that two hashes match with equal chance. Meanwhile, we assume that an upper
bound is reached when p(n) > 0.999. Solving n2 − n > 2 × 32 ln 1000 gives an ap-
proximate upper bound of n = 22. A very higher rate of finding a collision pair can
be a potential security problem. By expanding the location range from 32 to 2048, the
bound limitations are changed to 54 and 169.
The maximum weight of RWA, however, does not follow a uniform distribu-
tion. As shown in Figure 5.3, the maximum weight follows a normal distribution
N(1008, 1062). Assuming px and py are probability density functions for the maxi-





px py = 0.0027 (5.14)
This means that one pair of collisions may be found in about 371 pairs of responses.
Though the maximum weight should theoretically match the range of weight from 0 to
1800, it barely appears at both sides of the normal distribution, but is centralized near
the mean value of the curve. By replacing 32 with 371 in Equation 6.9, the lower bound
and upper bound of weight-based collision are given as 24 and 73.
Mixed RWA refers to a combination of 11-bit maximum weight value, 11-bit
minimum weight value, 5-bit maximum location value, and 5-bit minimum location
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value. The theoretical maximum possibility of the mixed RWA value is the multiplica-
tion of four parts (370.37×370.37×32×32), By taking four factors together, the upper
bound and lower bound increase significantly. Table 5.2 shows the number of responses
an attacker must try to achieve a 50% or 99.9% probability of success. Compared to
the ECC/Bloom filter approach, our mixed RWA scheme is much more difficult for at-
tackers to generate fitting responses and find a collision. The number of guesses can be
limited to enhance the security level.
Table 5.2: Security Comparison of Different Schemes - Number of response guesses
required to achieve 50% or 99.9% success rate
scheme 50% 99.9%
ECC & Bloom filter 128 402
maximum or minimum location-based RWA 8 22
maximum or minimum location shift RWA 54 169
maximum or minimum weight-based RWA 24 73
mixed RWA 13955 44053
5.4 Evaluation and Discussion
In this section, results of different authentication schemes are compared: no ECC,
traditional ECC only, ECC plus Bloom Filter, Ring Weight Algorithm, Helper Data
Algorithm, and fuzzy extractor. We provide simulation results of authenticating one
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million chips with different schemes. To measure the collision rate, another group of
one million cloned chips are simulated with random responses. Since it is not practi-
cal to implement one million different real PUFs, we use simulation and assume the
PUF responses have robust and uniform bit strings according to [11, 20, 42]. The PUF
bit probabilities are independent and there is no significant bias in the PUF responses.
Environmental conditions and aging only generate bit errors, but do not change our
assumptions. In our simulations, we assume a roughly 10% bit error rate such that the
bit errors in each response follow a normal distribution around a mean of 12. These
assumptions track with results obtained in the literature [1, 11, 49]. Thus, the simulated
results can present the real case of PUFs. Apart from simulation results, we also test
the performance of RWA based on the implementation of ring oscillators-based PUFs
(RO PUFs) and arbiter PUFs on Xilinx FPGA.
5.4.1 Error Correcting/Bloom Filter Matching
We start with a 16 × 8 ECC coding where the 128-bit response is split up into eight
groups, each of which has its own BCH code word. Thus, one response with an aver-
age of 12 errors will be decoded eight times before authentication. The false positives
and false negatives are shown in Table 5.3. m, t, k and r refer to the dimension of Galois
Field, number of errors that can be corrected, length of information bit, and number of
parity checks. BF counter defines the number of chips that cannot be authenticated.
ECC counter presents the number of responses that cannot be corrected by the BCH
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code. For the best case, only three chips (out of one million) failed to be correctly iden-
tified through the Bloom Filter and error correction. Data rate refers to the efficiency of
the error correction scheme - i.e. kk+r , the ratio of number of data bits to number of bits
in the code. As can be seen, the overhead for these methods is quite high - to achieve
the low error rate, one requires an overhead of 48 bits or three times the data.
Table 5.3: 16 × 8 Bits ECC/BF Authentication Results
m t k r data BF ECC false false
rate counter counter positive negative
6 4 16 24 0.40 42556 42588 2.54×10−4 4.26×10−2
6 5 16 28 0.36 4731 4734 2.54×10−4 4.73×10−3
6 6 16 36 0.31 356 356 2.54×10−4 3.56×10−4
6 7 16 44 0.27 20 20 2.54×10−4 2.00×10−5
6 8 16 48 0.25 3 3 2.54×10−4 3.00×10−6
The overhead can be improved somewhat with a 128 × 1 BCH coding solution
as shown in Table 5.4 at the cost of higher false negative rates. However, it still has
a nearly 100% overhead in memory space. Also, the system is much more compute
intensive due to a larger amount of encoding and decoding calculation.
5.4.2 Weight and Location Tolerance
To simplify the bit error correction processing, the ring weight algorithm is composed
of the following parts: peak weight value, peak location value, valley weight value,
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Table 5.4: 128 × 1 Bits ECC/BF Authentication Results
m t k r data BF ECC false false
rate counter counter positive negative
8 12 128 92 0.58 226059 226124 2.54×10−4 2.26×10−1
8 13 128 100 0.56 83739 83771 2.54×10−4 8.37×10−2
8 14 128 108 0.54 16512 16522 2.54×10−4 1.65×10−2
8 15 128 116 0.52 4072 4076 2.54×10−4 4.08×10−3
and valley location value which are calculated according to the responses. If the value
locates in the tolerance range, then the response passes the authentication. Figures 5.17
and 5.18 show the performance of different location and weight tolerance ranges with
12-bit errors in each 128-bit response. For most cases, the simulated false positive and
false negative rates match the theoretical result. With wider tolerance ranges, the false
negative decreases but the false positive increases.
When using this authentication method, the difference of maximum weight and
its probability of false positive should follow a normal distribution. The standard devi-
ation σ depends on the range of weight value. A wider range of weight makes σ larger,
which can filter more false responses for the authentication process. The false positive








pi(1 − p)n−i, p = pφ (5.15)
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Fig. 5.17: False negative and false positive rate related to location-tolerance
Fig. 5.18: False negative and false positive rate related to weight-tolerance
5.4.3 Location Shift
The effect of the location shift scheme is shown in Figure 5.19. The offset address bits
are extended to 11 bits in order to obtain up to 2048 location shift. As can be seen, the
false positives drop significantly as peak and valley location value are shifted by offset
bits.
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Fig. 5.19: False positive of different shift spaces
5.4.4 Fault Tolerance Capacity
To measure the fault tolerant capacity, the average bit errors in responses is set from 3
to 18. Since bit error does not affect the false positive rate, which refers to a random
response with or without bit errors, we only focus on the relationship between the bit
error number, tolerance range, and the false negative rate. In Figures 5.20 and 5.21,
[−3, 3] location-tolerant range and [−70, 70] weight-tolerant range show distinct shift-
ing, which can help reduce the false negative rate but increase the false positive rate.
When the tolerance value continues increasing, the data come to a convergence.
5.4.5 Weight Optimization
To further improve the authentication accuracy, the deviation of weight set {w1, . . . , w32}
is reduced. Giving up the weight trade-off showed in Figure 5.2, we merge the values to
meet the requirement of false negative. Various weight patterns are measured, among
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Fig. 5.20: False negative of different bit errors with different location-tolerance
Fig. 5.21: False negative of different bit errors with different weight-tolerance
which results of five groups are shown in Figure 5.22. By reducing the maximum
weight pattern from 16 to 7, the false negative decreases from 1.58% to 0.02%.
5.4.6 Offset Bit Flipping
For the location shift scheme, reversing the offset address bit before shifting the valley
location value is an efficient way to further reduce false positives. Since the peak and
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Fig. 5.22: False negative of different weight distribution methods
valley location values are added to different shift values, the probability of getting a
collision becomes smaller. In Figure 5.23, 150s and 200s refer to same offset bits with
±150 and ±200 weight-tolerant range. 150d and 200d add different location shift values
for original peak and valley location. As a result, offset bit flipping reduces the false
positive rate greatly.
5.4.7 Application Field
RWA can be applied to different types of PUFs. However, depending on the particular
PUF implementation, the distribution of 1’s and 0’s in the PUF response may not be
uniformly distributed or may even have a bias to ’1’ or ’0’. Both the weight-tolerance
and location-tolerance approaches have some resistance to these variations. We sim-
ulated nine groups of CRP authentications and show the worst cases in Figure 5.24.
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Fig. 5.23: False positive and false negative rates of different 2048 location shift meth-
ods
With a 20% bias from the ideal baseline of 50% ’1’ and 50% ’0’, the false negative rate
is still less than 0.5%. However, if 0’s or 1’s reach significant majority, any minority
occurrence due to the bit error will obtain larger chance to cause the shift of the overall
weight and location value. The false positive rate depends on both the bias in the base-
line response as well as the bias in the response under test. The false positive 1 curve
shows the false positive rate if both responses have the same bias, and we can see that
the false positive rate remains constant at less than 10−3. The curve of false positive
2 shows a different situation, under which the bias of the baseline varies from 30% to
70% while the response under test keeps a bias of 50%. As a result, the false positive
is reduced when there are more differences between the response pair, which means a
collision will be more easily found with the same bias. Therefore, if the response of
a PUF shows good randomness and acceptable bias, RWA can archive the lowest false
negative. The bias will only help to reduce the false positive when the bits between the
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baseline and the response under test have more than 5% difference.
Fig. 5.24: Effect of response bias on false positive and negative rates
5.4.8 Overall Performance Consideration
Figure 5.25 shows the effect of adding various optimization methods to RWA. We start
with baseline and then add the location shift optimization, weight optimization and
offset bit flipping optimization. By involving these schemes step by step, we can reduce
the false positive and false negative significantly with only a slight increase in overhead.
Figure 5.26 shows how the number of errors affects the false negative rate. The effect
becomes significant with more than 6 errors per 128 bits. Since the false positive rate
is not affected by the number of errors, but is a consequence of the compression due to
RWA, the false positive rate curve remains flat.
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Fig. 5.25: Performance comparison of different fault tolerant methods
Fig. 5.26: Overall effect of number of errors
Table 5.5 shows the overall comparison of the different solutions. Since the bit
error rate follows a normal distribution, the probability that no error occurs in 128 bits
becomes infinitesimal. If no ECC is used for direct bit matching, no chip passes authen-
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tication. Once BCH ECC is applied, the false negative decreases while the overhead
increases. The ECC and Bloom Filter solution provides acceptable false positive and
false negative rates at the cost of large computation and memory space. Our novel
ring weight algorithm and corresponding optimization shows accurate authentication
rate without ECC. We achieve the best performance by setting the absolute value of
location-tolerance to 4 firstly. When the difference of two peak locations and the differ-
ence of two valley locations are smaller than 4, the response under test is authenticated
as passed. If it is not satisfied, we extend the absolute value of location range to 32, but
set the absolute value of weight-tolerance to 200. Given a response with its baseline
that cannot meet all the constraints of the peak weight, valley weight, peak location, and
valley location, it will be regarded as failed. Smaller memory space and less computa-
tion are also its advantages compared to other solutions. Meanwhile, it does not cause
security issues since the collision is hard to find, even if attackers copy the location shift
information.
There has been some prior work to use non-ECC helper data to reduce failure
rates - in particular the Helper Data Algorithm (HDA) [8] and the fuzzy extractor [9].
In Table 5.6, we show a comparison of these algorithms with our RWA algorithm.
The reported error rates, memory overhead, and failure rates come from the relevant
papers. For our RWA algorithm, we show a range of error rates and the respective
failure rates. As can be seen, HDA produces 128-bit PUF responses with a failure rate
of 10−6. However, the memory overhead of HDA is 317 times that of RWA. If a nonce
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No ECC 15.26 0 1 0 1
ECC only 38.15 0 1.71×10−2 0 4.26×10−2
ECC & BF 15.85 2.54×10−4 9.88×10−4 2.54×10−4 1.65×10−2
Ring Weight 4.53 8.81×10−2 5.18×10−2 8.81×10−2 6.41×10−2
Ring Weight (Opt.) 5.25 8.20×10−4 1.66×10−4 8.20×10−4 4.28×10−4
is applied to the CRPs, the memory space taken by HDA would be a heavy burden to a
database. Moreover, RWA can authenticate one million CRPs in 9 seconds on average
while HDA takes 206 seconds. The fuzzy extractor algorithm needs 450 ring oscillators
to build one 128-bit response with a failure rate of 10−6. As the bit error rate increases,
more ring oscillators are required to keep a low failure rate. However, RWA does not
rely on hardware. In addition, though not reported in [9], the calculation complexity of
the fuzzy extractor is much higher than that of RWA. With much smaller memory space,
RWA can be applied to any type of PUF. Therefore, HDA and the fuzzy extractor have
good applications in PUF-based key generation where reduced failure rate is important.
However, the large size and computational complexity, make it impractical for large-
scale chip authentication where a database would need to store multiple challenges for
each device to be authenticated. Conversely, RWA exhibits the best trade-off and can
be an acceptable PUF post-processing solution for IC authentication.
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Table 5.6: Overall Comparison with Other Solutions
HDA fuzzy extractor RWA
PUF type SRAM PUF RO PUF any type
error rate 15% 9% 21% 9% to 21%
helper data memory overhead (bit) 13952 450 770 44
PUF bits required for 128 bits 1536 450 770 128
failure rate 10−6 10−6 10−5 to 10−3
computing time (µs per response) 205 not mentioned 9
5.4.9 Performance of RWA with PUF Implementations
To take the measurement noise, bit bias, and other factors into consideration, we eval-
uated the performance of RWA with real CRPs from ring oscillator (RO) PUFs [1] and
arbiter PUFs [39]. We implemented three RO PUFs on a Kintex-7 FPGA and applied
128-bit challenges to generate 128-bit responses. All the FPGA LUT-based inverters
in the ROs are well-placed to guarantee the equivalent delays between any selected
pair. Every challenge, which is generated by a pseudo random number generator, is
measured 20 times on each PUF. The first 10 responses are used to generate a base-
line while the average value of the last 10 responses is regarded as an unauthenticated
response under test. As a strong PUF, each PUF provides 100,000 challenge-response
pairs. Table 5.7 shows the response bias, bit error rate, false negative rate and false
positive rate. As we mentioned in Figure 5.24, false positive 1 is computed between a
baseline and a random response with the same bias while false positive 2 uses a random
response with a fixed 50% bias. Note, the computed value of false negative from RO
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PUF 3 is shown as 0, but it should be regarded as less than 1.00 × 10−5 as we only
authenticate 100,000 groups of data. We also evaluated the use of arbiter PUFs, which
are also implemented on Kintex-7 FPGA. Though all the MUX cells are well-placed,
the responses of arbiter PUFs still have more than 5% bit bias. Compared with the
simulation results in Figure 5.24 and Figure 5.26, the measurement errors of both false
negative rates and false positive rates are acceptable. These results show that RWA is
effective in authenticating real PUFs.
Table 5.7: Performance of RWA with Real PUFs
PUF type bias bit error rate false negative false positive 1 false positive 2
RO PUF 1 54.68% 11.56% 1.09 × 10−3 8.40 × 10−4 8.90 × 10−4
RO PUF 2 49.76% 7.13% 4.80 × 10−4 8.00 × 10−4 9.00 × 10−4
RO PUF 3 51.06% 3.12% < 1.00 × 10−5 8.30 × 10−4 9.10 × 10−4
arbiter PUF 1 41.26% 3.31% < 1.00 × 10−5 6.40 × 10−4 5.80 × 10−4
arbiter PUF 2 44.71% 4.22% 6.00 × 10−5 8.10 × 10−4 9.10 × 10−4
arbiter PUF 3 41.52% 2.89% 3.00 × 10−5 7.10 × 10−4 7.00 × 10−4
If we were willing to tolerate large numbers of bit errors in the responses, one
could conceivably improve the false negative rates significantly. The following analysis
provides an estimate of bounds on the false negative rates with errors. We collected one
million responses from RO PUF 1, and unlike the NO ECC solution in Table 5.5, this
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time, a threshold is set as the fault tolerance method. In other words, if the compared
responses have fewer unmatched bits than the threshold, the authentication regards the
response as a success. Since the bit errors in RO PUF 1 follow a normal distribution,
a few responses with 20 or more errors require a large threshold. As shown in Ta-
ble 5.8, we need to tolerate more than 1/4 fault bits of the response. As a result, even
if we set no constraints on the number of errors and storage space, the performance
can be hardly improved. Applying ECC or other helper data schemes to improve the
performance increases the storage needs significantly which makes them less practical
in industry settings. On the other hand, our RWA approach achieves comparable fail-
ure rates with reduced storage than this simple threshold-based scheme or other more
advanced schemes.
Table 5.8: False Negative of Bit-by-bit Comparison
threshold false negative threshold false negative
0 bit 1 20 bits 8.65 × 10−2
4 bits 9.98 × 10−1 24 bits 1.30 × 10−2
8 bits 9.47 × 10−1 28 bits 1.06 × 10−3
12 bits 7.01 × 10−1 32 bits 4.30 × 10−5
16 bits 3.26 × 10−1 36 bits 1.00 × 10−6
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5.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, three solutions are presented for industrial authenticating challenge-
response pairs from physically unclonable functions. Our simulation, based on one
million PUFs, shows that a practical error correcting and Bloom filter matching scheme
achieves 10−4 false positive rate, 10−2 false negative rate, and a data rate of 0.58. Our
proposed fault tolerant ring weight scheme is implemented using three rings which
indicate weight, location and response values. With different types of optimization, it
can achieve a false positive rate of 10−4 and a false negative rate of 10−4 with a data
rate of 0.74. We also apply true CRPs from RO PUFs and arbiter PUFs to show that
RWA is effective in practice. Moreover, the new scheme, which does not rely on ECC,
requires little computing time and memory space. The lower bound and upper bound
of collisions are acceptable in the case of real industry needs. For a given amount of
storage space, our scheme provides the best authentication accuracy.
Chapter 6
PUF Initialization Table for Robust Authentication and Key
Generation
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we proposed a novel PUF design. Though the bit error rate has
been reduced significantly, post-processing is still required for many applications. In
this chapter, we propose a PUF initialization Process (PIP) to record the entire feature
of a PUF, which can improve the stability in different applications. To evaluate the
practicality, we provide two PIP-based authentication solutions with very low false
positive and false negative rate. Additionally, we combine the error correction and
bit selection scheme together by proposing a PIP-based key generation solution using
our floating thresholding algorithm and helper data, which improves the stability of
responses for various PUFs.
104
105
6.2 PUF Initialization Process
When PUF applications require reproducible responses with the same challenges, stor-
ing CRPs is a direct, high-cost and unsecure storage method. If we take into account
the instability feature, which needs a strong ECC for post-processing, the whole solu-
tion becomes more time-consuming and memory-wasting. In this section, we provide
a simple but practical data structure to record the useful features of PUFs, which is
regarded as a fundamental element of improving the bit selection efficiency and PUF
stability.
6.2.1 PUF Initialization Table Generation
The PUF initialization table (PIT) is a critical part in our solution, as the basic idea of
PIP is to test the stability of all the RO pairs combinations in a PUF in order to generate
a PIT with trusted output values. To create the PIT, we use an initialization challenge
generator (ICG) to feed our optimized RO PUF with repeated challenges. Algorithm 4
states the details of PIP: We first fix the higher address register addr A and change the
lower address register addr B from 0 to 127. After 1,000 repeated measurements, the
register values of CounterL, CounterS , and CounterE are recorded in the PIT, in which
we set the base address to addr A, and the offset address ranges from 0 to 127. Then
the test will restart between the next RO in array A and the 128 ROs in array B. When
the PIP is completed, the PIT contains an entire feature copy of a PUF, which can be
used for authentication and key generation. It should be noted that other PUFs do not
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need to record CounterE, as they are unnecessary to generate output by comparing the
counter values.
6.2.2 Analysis of PIT Model
When we downloaded the same bitstream file into the same FPGA, the generated PIT
had minor changes. A solution is to calculate the average value of each parameter
among multiple PITs from the same PUF. Here we use 10 samples to build the model.
This PIT model presents more accurate features of a PUF compared to a random PIT.
Data analysis of the PIT model is given in Table 6.1. Since all 16,384 RO pairs are
tested 1,000 times, the sum of the three states is 1,000 for any selected challenge ad-
dress. Each state has a counter value ranging from 0 to 1,000. In our 3-state PUF,
larger, smaller, and equal state have roughly equal percentages. Among the 16,384
RO pairs, there are more than 3,000 larger cases and smaller cases with a counter
value of 1,000 - in other words all 1000 tests give the same larger or smaller results.
There are no cases where the equal state was recorded in all 1,000 measurements. This
indicates that 3105+301416384 = 37.35% RO pairs can generate very stable responses. We call
them the confident set. Though it cannot guarantee the same values completely during
the PIT regeneration, the stability is enough to identify a 128-bit response.
107
Algorithm 4 PUF initialization process
1: procedure PIP
2: reset CounterL, CounterS , CounterE, i, addr A, addr B
3: loop 1:
4: reset CounterA, CounterB
5: loop 2:
6: read RO(addr A),RO(addr B)
7: if clockcycle < 16 then goto loop 2
8: if CounterA > CounterB then
9: CounterL← CounterL + 1
10: else if CounterA < CounterB then
11: CounterS ← CounterS + 1
12: else if CounterA = CounterB then
13: CounterE ← CounterE + 1
14: i← i + 1
15: if i < 1000 then goto loop 1
16: output CounterL,CounterS , CounterE
17: reset CounterL,CounterS , CounterE
18: i← 0
19: addr B← addr B + 1
20: if addr B < 128 then goto loop 1
21: addr B← 0
22: addr A← addr A + 1
23: if addr A < 128 then goto loop 1.
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Table 6.1: Parameters of Our PIT Model
Counter A vs. Counter B larger smaller equal
percentage of each state 33.93% 34.16% 31.91%
state counter value = 0 7384 7178 7838
state counter value = 1000 3105 3014 50
6.3 PIT-based Authentication Application
A direct application of PIT is PUF-based authentication, which is shown in Figure 6.1.
Before embedding an RO PUF into a chip or a system, the PIP must be invoked once
to obtain the unique PIT. The ICG becomes active during PIP and enables RO pairs
in our predefined sequences. Meanwhile, CounterL, CounterS , and CounterE in the
optimization unit collect the data from CounterA and CounterB in the RO PUF. These
counter values are sent to FIFO and will be transferred to a database as a PIT. When the
PIP finishes, normal CRP tests are launched for authentication. Ideally, our CRPs will
only select RO pairs that have been deemed stable by the PIP. However, since we use
a Challenge S hi f t Register to select RO pairs, it requires every 14-bit output from the
128 shifts to select a stable RO pair and the probability of finding such a challenge is
only 37.35%. In order to address this problem, we provide block RAM-based solution
and threshold-based solution.
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Fig. 6.1: Our PUF-based authentication design using PIT
6.3.1 Block RAM-based solution
One solution is to replace the challenge shift register with a block RAM (BRAM),
which has a width of 14 bits and a depth of 128. Since there is no constraint on the input
pattern, a challenge can be generated in the database by selecting 128 addresses from
the confident set randomly. Then the 14×128 bits challenge is sent to the block RAM in
the FPGA. The counter values are read as responses for authentication. Table 6.2 gives
a typical protocol of the communication and the authentication. Since the challenges
will only select stable RO pairs, a counter value of 1,000 means 100% stable. Other
than that, the probability of the counter value follows half of the normal distribution
N(1000, 1) from 0 to 1,000 according to our tests. That is to say, when the counter value
is located as 999, 998, and less than 998, it roughly stands for a confidence interval of
68%, 27%, and 5% in the normal distribution. Therefore we can simplify the response
by using 3-bit coding instead of transferring counter values directly. The highest bit
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stands for the response output. The lower two bits present the stability of the highest
bit. Every value is multiplied with their corresponding score during authentication.
To decide whether a CRP passes or fails, the sum of these multiplication results is
compared with a threshold score. We find a balance between false positive and false
negative by testing different scores and thresholds.
Table 6.2: Protocol of Our Authentication Method
range of counter value tolerance interval output score
CounterL = 1000 µ 111 0
CounterL ∈ [999, 1000) [µ − σ, µ) 110 1
CounterL ∈ [998, 999) [µ − 2σ, µ − σ) 101 3
CounterL ∈ [0, 998) [0, µ − 2σ) 100 5
CounterS = 1000 µ 011 0
CounterS ∈ [999, 1000) [µ − σ, µ) 010 1
CounterS ∈ [998, 999) [µ − 2σ, µ − σ) 001 3
CounterS ∈ [0, 998) [0, µ − 2σ) 000 5
To prove the false negative bound, we compare the PIT model with five PITs
generated by random measurements. The average occurrence times of score 1, 3, and
5 are marked as im, jm, and km. In the random challenge generation process without
selecting repeated RO pairs, a set (i, j, k) is chosen for authentication, in which i ∈
[0, im], j ∈ [0, jm], k ∈ [0, km]. Among all the combinations of (i, j, k), some subsets
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The subsets also need to meet the following constraints:
iˆ + jˆ + kˆ ≤ response bit width (6.2)
iˆ + jˆ × 3 + kˆ × 5 > threshold score (6.3)
The false positive proof is based on a scenario that the attacker knows our al-
gorithm and only the 111 and 011 outputs are used to maximize the collision rate.
Therefore, in the set (i, j, k), both i and j are 0. Collision occurs when no more than kt
values are mismatched in order to meet the constraint kt × 5 ≤ threshold score. In that












In another solution, 128-bit challenges are generated randomly without referring to the
values in a PIT so that we do not need to modify the Challenge S hi f t Register in the
RO PUFs. Instead, the values of CounterL, CounterS , and CounterE are sent to the
112
database directly. This is because unstable RO pairs are included by random challenges.
In order to tolerate the increasing instability, the authentication requires more accurate
information. We also notice that the distributions of the counter values from unstable
RO pairs are not as stable as those of stable RO pairs, which means using the confidence
interval of a fixed normal distribution curve is impractical. Therefore, we propose an
improved solution in Algorithm 5. We first check if the counter value of the larger
state or smaller state has high stability in the corresponding address of the PIT model.
Slight floating measurement errors are tolerated. When both states show low stability,
we need to check all three states to evaluate the confidence degree. If no constraint is
met, it is regarded as a failed RO pair. A CRP will pass authentication only when the
failure number is smaller than a threshold t.
Algorithm 5 Segment of threshold-based authentication
1: procedure threshold
2: score = 0
3: for i ∈ {0, . . . , 127} do
4: get PIT addr from the challenge
5: if PIT (addr).CounterL > 800 and ∆CounterL < 100 then n← n
6: else if PIT (addr).CounterS > 800 and ∆CounterS < 100 then n← n
7: else if ∆CounterL + ∆CounterS + ∆CounterE < 500 then n← n
8: else n← n + 1
9: if n ≤ t then CRP passes
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To calculate the false negative bound in this solution, we need to know the num-
ber of failed RO pairs between the PIT model and an unauthenticated PUF. Marked as
m, the number ranging from t + 1 to min{m, 128} will cause an authentication failure.














The false positive rate is similar to Equation 6.4, but the probability of meeting
the constraint is not fixed to 12 . We use p to represent the probability of a random








(1 − p)n p128−n (6.6)
Traditional PUF applications require significant storage space for CRPs. For the





challenges given a fixed
128-bit data length. However, traditional authentication methods need almost infinite
memory to store all the CRPs. By sticking to only stable challenges from the confident





× 2 × 128 = 8.23 × 10264 MB. It still takes
2.50 MB to store only 10,000 CRPs for one PUF. Meanwhile, a small CRP set is not a
secure way for authentication. If all the CRPs in the memory are used, a replay attack
will be 100% successful. However, our PIT solution only requires 480 KB memory size
to generate all possible CRPs for authentication. All we need to store are the initialized
counter values (30 bits) for 128 × 128 RO pairs. It can be even smaller (48 KB) if we
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replace the counter value with a 3-bit threshold. Another advantage of using PIT is,
with a set of 3.37 × 10268 stable responses, we can apply a cryptographic nonce to our
challenge generation in order to prevent replay attack.
6.4 PIT-based Key Generation Solution
PIT provides sufficient accuracy for authentication purposes. However, PUF-based key
generator is much more difficult to be implemented. Given the same input, PUFs are
required to consistently produce exactly the same output, which has been proved to be
almost impossible due to the instability. To eliminate the bit errors, error correction
codes are widely applied as industrial solutions. But the hardware memory of a PUF
cannot afford the huge overhead when a large amount of keys are generated. On the
other side, bit selection schemes hold a strong capability of avoiding using the most
unstable bits but fail to eliminate the remaining errors. With each advantage in mind,
we propose a PIT-based key generator in this section by combining these two solutions
together.
6.4.1 PIT-based Floating Thresholding Bit Selection Scheme
Instead of selecting the most stable bits only, which reduces the CRP entropies sig-
nificantly, we focus on finding a floating threshold for the current PUF response to
minimize the effect from the systematic variation and the environmental noise. Our
target is to reach a balance among the stability, entropies, and resources. The proce-
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dure begins with generating five PITs from the same PUF, as shown in Algorithm 6.
Before each PIT generation, we launch an entire PUF reset except the processor and
the memory in order to enhance the accuracy of the stability estimation. This is be-
cause the RO PUF responses measured after physical reset show poorer stability than
those running continuously without poweroff according to our tests. All five PITs are
stored in the memory temporarily. Then, we fetch the counter values of the larger,
smaller, and equal states from the first RO pair of each PIT. These five groups of data
can be presented as five points on a 3D surface, which are shown as the red marks in
Figure 6.2. Meanwhile, the 16,384 blue marks provide a clear distribution of counter
values from a randomly selected PIT. In the next step, the processor calculates the cen-
ter and radius of an enclosing circle for the five points. As we set the PIT loop to 1,000
(counterlarger + countersmaller + counterequal = 1, 000), all the points are enclosed in a
circle instead of a sphere. The circle can be regarded as the possible range of counter
values for the first RO pair. Since the distribution shows a convergence trend to two
lines (counterlarger + counterequal = 1, 000 and countersmaller + counterequal = 1, 000),
we can simply consider the counterlarger or countersmaller within the overlapped range
between the circle and the two lines. After storing the overlapped boundary in the
memory, we repeat the process for the remaining 16,383 groups of data and accumulate
the new overlapped boundaries to the previous ones. Once completed, we obtain the
possible location distributions of the larger state and smaller state for all the RO pairs
in a PUF, which are shown as group 1 in Figure 6.3. The cumulative value of 0 is about
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7,800 while the cumulative value of 1,000 is about 3,100. For the remaining part, we
can find the minimum value and set the x-axis as a floating threshold. Particularly, the
locations are 860 and 909 for the larger state and smaller state in group 1. Thus, we
connect (860,0,140) and (0,909,91) with a magenta line in Figure 6.2 as the floating
threshold of group 1. Now we select 128 points by hashing a challenge plus an offset.
If a point is below the floating threshold and very close to either of the two blue lines,
it generates a 1-bit response. Otherwise, it is regarded as unstable and will be ignored
during the key generation. For either case, the challenge is incremented by 1 to generate































Fig. 6.2: 3D distributions of counter values and the floating threshold generation of
three states for the RO PUF responses
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Algorithm 6 Segment of floating thresholding solution
1: procedure Floating thresholding
2: receive Challenge
3: for i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} do
4: reset PUF except MicroBlaze and S DRAM
5: generate PIT (i) and store it in S DRAM
6: for j ∈ {1, . . . , 16384} do
7: fetch RO pair( j) counter values from PIT (1, 5)
8: calculate the enclosing circle of the five points
9: cumulate and store the overlapped boundary
10: if Helper Data is invalid then
11: set the minimum boundaries as floating threshold
12: select 128 stable points with hash(Challenge++)
13: generate Helper Data for less stable RO pairs
14: output Response and Helper Data
15: else
16: regenerate the floating threshold with new PITs
17: decode Helper Data
18: select 128 stable points with hash(Challenge++)
19: output Response after error correction
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Fig. 6.3: Possible location distribution of larger states and smaller states based on two
groups of RO PUF test results
After group 2 is generated in Figure 6.3, a new floating threshold is plotted in
Figure 6.2 as the cyan line. In this case, the new floating threshold is very close to
the original magenta line. If the counter position of an RO pair changes between the
stable and unstable state easily, we define it as a marginal point. Among all 16,384
points, there are about five whose center points stay on different sides of the floating
thresholding lines. In the worst case, we assume that any of these five RO pairs can
cause a failure when they are selected. Then the upper bound of the failure rate in
128-bit keys is







) = 0.0833 (6.7)
in which 7429 is the number of points that are located below the threshold line in group
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1. On the other hand, if we use a fixed threshold, the failure rate is







) = 0.8118 (6.8)
6.4.2 PIT-based Floating Thresholding Error Correction Scheme
If challenges are generated by the PUF itself, we can avoid selecting the RO pairs
with marginal points near the thresholds. Then, there is no extra overhead for error
correcting. However, for the general case when challenges are provided from another
device, helper data is required to correct any potential bit error in the responses. Unlike
traditional ECCs, which address the entire binary string, we apply a low-cost helper
data that only focuses on the sensitive bits generated by the points near the thresholds.
Given the top five RO pairs with potential error correction requirements in our example,
we rank them in order of stability. In Figure 6.4, they are located in the 46th, 116th,
47th, 24th, and 42nd bit in a 128-bit key circle with black buckets. To generate the
helper data of the 46th bit, we set a start point at 0 and a distance. Now we search for
another four locations with the equivalent distance between each, one of which must
locate in 46, but none of which locates in 24, 42, 47, and 116. With a distance of
23, these five red buckets in the middle circle contain only one point near the floating
threshold. Once a key is generated, we apply XOR operations to the bits located in
Set 1 {0, 23, 46, 69, 92}, which will generate 1-bit codeword. To generate Set 2 and the
codeword for the next bit located in 116, we shift the start point to 1 and repeat the
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previous steps. Since the distance of 81 is too large to generate the remaining three
locations, we can use the least positive remainder after divided by 128. Thus the bits in
the location of {1, 82, 35, 116, 69} generate the second codeword, which are shown as
the orange buckets in the middle and external ring. Similarly, we select the green, blue,
and purple buckets for the sets related to 47, 24, and 42.
Fig. 6.4: Helper data generation for our floating thresholding key generation solution
Given the start point (s), locations (Ln), and distances (Dn), the helper data gen-
eration should follow
∃!Ln = s+n−1+i×Dn i ∈ [0,m−1]∀Ln , s+n−1+i×Dn i ∈ [0,m−1]n ∈ [1, nmax] n ∈ [1, nmax] n , n
(6.9)
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in which the nmax is the number of marginal points and m is the number of buckets
selected for XOR operations. In our example, both nmax and m are set to 5. When a key
is generated for the first time, the input helper data is all 0 and regarded as invalid. The
helper data, including start point, locations, and parity, is generated and output with its
response. During the regeneration, the same helper data is received along with the orig-
inal challenge. While most incorrect RO pair selections are solved by the new floating
threshold, the rest ones can be corrected by the decoded helper data. Comparing these
two groups of data, few points may stay on one side of the first threshold but the other
side of the second threshold. If a marginal point is selected to generate one bit and it
stays on the same side of a new threshold during the key regeneration, it can be easily
verified by the decoded locations. Once it merges to the other side, there is 1-bit right
shift for the binary string after this point. With the information of the recorded marginal
points, this error can be detected and corrected easily. Given a marginal point ignored
by the original key, it can be aware by the decoded locations during the key regeneration
unless there is a location collision. But we are still able to detect an error since the en-
tire locations and the parities are not matched. To correct the potential 1-bit right shift,
we can try to ignore the recorded marginal point and check the new response with the
helper data. In order to minimize the collision rate, we apply an additional checksum
to the original key. For example, the checksum can be a 10-bit parities or hash value
generated by the entire key. If there are several bit strings that match the locations and
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the parities from the decoded helper data, we can compare the checksum of the new
key with the original one to find out which one should be the correct key.
The exploding memory utilization of PUF-based key generation is more critical
than other applications because of the highest accuracy requirement. Traditional solu-
tions usually apply BCH ECC to correct as many as t bit errors in 128-bit responses. If
a typical RO PUF has a bit error rate of 9% in average, and the error number distribution
requires an ECC with 18-bit correction capability. The number of parity-check digits r
can be calculated as r = n − k = 2m − 1 − 128 ≤ mt = 18t. The smallest t that meets
the inequality is 8, which means r is at least 127 bits. According to our measurement,
the failure rate is higher than 10−2. To archive a lower failure rate, the overhead can be
much larger than the generated key. The linear expanding storage requirement limits
the application. For the floating thresholding solution with a key length of 128 bits, the
start point is log2128 bits. Since the distances are variable, we fix the length using the
largest one Dmax. Dmax is recommended to be set to 127 according to our simulation, as
it is large enough to find all the locations. The codeword also includes nmax-bit parities
and c-bit checksum. Thus, the entire codeword has 7 + log2Dmax × nmax + nmax + c bits.
6.4.3 Security Consideration of PIT-based solutions
Apart from the increasing cost of resources, PUF applications also suffer from being at-
tacked or modeled as the PUF information stored in the database can be easily exposed
to adversaries. For our key generation solution, this vulnerability can be safely ignored
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as a PIT will be deleted after generating sufficient pairs of challenges and helper data.
Unlike ECC, the remaining data will not disclose any information that could be used to
recover the relevant responses.
With respect to PUF components, most modeling attacks are based on the as-
sumption that the PUF structure is known [17]. Given k ring oscillators in the RO PUF,
two of them are selected and compared in order to produce a single output bit. This
structure leads to k(k − 1)/2 CRPs. For the worst scenario, the CRP interface is public
and accessible. Then one can measure all the RO frequencies ( f1, ..., fk) in ascending
order. The approach requires a low-degree polynomial calculation with a complexity
of O(k · logk). However, it is inefficient and expensive to open the package, probe
the circuit, and apply the attack in reality. First of all, one needs to identify the PUF
type, which is difficult on an FPGA. Secondly, the interface may not release the orig-
inal information of CRPs. When a hash function is added between the challenge and
the RO input, the learning complexity increases. XOR architecture can also be applied
between the RO output and the response, which is proved to be effective against the
machine learning attacks [17]. If we take these facts into account, the 128-bit keys in
our solution are still secure against attacks with limited cost.
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6.5 Data Analysis and Evaluation
6.5.1 Experimental Setup
In this section, we continue to use RO PUFs to evaluate our solution step by step,
with results measured from three Kintex-7 FPGA based KC705 boards. Note that each
FPGA contains six PUFs. The temperature on the FPGA is controlled at 30◦C and the
voltage is 1.0V. To evaluate the stability, we also use temperature variation instrument
to test the PUF with different temperature ranges.
Fig. 6.5: PUF tests with temperature variation instrument
6.5.2 Hardware Resource Utilization
Here, we estimate the hardware cost of PIT-base PUF. The overall utilization on the
Kintex-7 is only 1.75% of the available look-up tables and 0.65% of the flip-flops,
which is shown in Table 6.3.
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Table 6.3: FPGA Resource Usage of One PUF Implementation
ref name used functional category










FDCE 20 Flop & Latch
LDCE 14 Flop & Latch
IBUF 4 IO
CARRY4 4 CarryLogic
FDSE 1 Flop & Latch
BUFG 1 Clock
6.5.3 Randomness
The NIST statistical test suite is a common technique used for entropy source and
cryptographic analysis [50]. Each input file contains 100,000 128-bit responses from
one PUF. All 18 PUFs with PIP pass the 15 NIST randomness tests, with cumulative
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p-values larger than 0.975.
6.5.4 Uniqueness
The uniqueness of the 18 PUFs is shown in Figure 6.6. The comparison is based on the
same PUF placement and bitstream in the three FPGAs. Thus, all three PUFs in each
group have no circuit level differences. We compare 100,000 128-bit responses from
each PUF with the same challenge set. All six groups have 50% ± 0.97% bits (64 bits)
flipped on average. The results are also verified by comparing the values of their PIT
models.
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Fig. 6.6: Inter-PUF hamming distances
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6.5.5 Stability
Figure 6.7 provides the stability comparison among the traditional design, lightweight
optimized design, and RO PUF with PIP. The raw bit error rate (RBER) in the tradi-
tional RO PUF is 7.13% in average. A few responses contain more than 20 bit errors,
which necessitates strong fault tolerance or error correction method. With our opti-
mization, the bit error rate decreases significantly. Further, if we only select the stable
RO pairs for output according to the PIT model, 76.73% of the responses have no bit
errors. Within the temperature range of a normal testing environment, the observed bit
error rates of our PUFs with PIP are less than 0.50%.



















RO PUF with PIP
curve fitting
Fig. 6.7: Intra-PUF hamming distance
Table 6.4 lists the average bit error rates from 18 PUFs. Again, we mark the six
PUFs on the second FPGA as PUF6 to PUF12 and those on the third FPGA as PUF13
to PUF18. Clearly, the stability of PUFs with PIP has been improved greatly compared
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to the traditional RO PUFs.
Table 6.4: Average Bit Error Rate
PUF 1 PUF 2 PUF 3 PUF 4 PUF 5 PUF 6
0.33% 0.47% 0.43% 0.37% 0.40% 0.35%
PUF 7 PUF 8 PUF 9 PUF 10 PUF 11 PUF 12
0.31% 0.32% 0.29% 0.36% 0.37% 0.30%
PUF 13 PUF 14 PUF 15 PUF 16 PUF 17 PUF 18
0.34% 0.43% 0.45% 0.41% 0.31% 0.38%
6.5.6 Bias
The response bias to ‘1’ in the traditional RO PUF design has an offset from −9% to 8%
according to our tests - i.e. the PUF produces 41% to 58% 1’s instead of the ideal 50%.
Apart from the physical uncontrollability, the close frequency of RO pairs intensifies
instability. Using our PIT architecture reduces the bias significantly to 50% ± 1.82%.
There is a slight bias towards ‘0’ in our PITs as shown in Figure 6.8. For example,
in the PIT model of PUF 1, there are 3105 0’s and 3014 1’s, which means the bias
of a random response is 50% − 0.73%. To achieve a bias of 50%, we can select the
value of ‘0’ or ‘1’ in the PIT model when generating challenges. Clearly, the bias is
well-controlled in our design.
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Fig. 6.8: Bias of 18 PUFs on three FPGAs
6.5.7 Result of PIT-based Authentication
The performance of our authentication solutions is tested on our RO PUFs with PIP.
In the BRAM-based solution, the threshold score is set to to 39 in order to balance the
failure rate and the collision rate. The results from six PUFs are given as an example in
Table 6.5. There are few mismatched values among all the stable RO pairs. On average,
only 29 combinations of RO pairs lead to authentication failures. Using Equations 6.1
and 6.4, we can calculate the false negative and false positive rates and we see that
they are smaller than 10−26. In the threshold-based solution, m is set to 68, the max-
imum number of failed RO pairs in any PUF. If we set the threshold, t, to 30, using
equations 6.5 and 6.7, the false negative and false positive rates are smaller than 10−47.
Specially, attacks on the first solution do not reply on the PIT model, so the bound in the
BRAM-based false positive rates are the same for all PUFs. However, the collisions in
the threshold-based solution is related to the PIT model, which leads to different bound
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in threshold-based false positive rates. Finally, we verified both solutions by testing 10
million random CRPs and no failure is detected during the authentication.
Table 6.5: Results of Authentication with PIP
PUF 1 PUF 2 PUF 3 PUF 4 PUF 5 PUF 6
stable RO pairs 6119 6302 6262 6183 6291 6201
BRAM-based Solution
(im, jm, km) (17,9,1) (34,5,0) (22,7,1) (28,10,0) (20,6,2) (25,3,2)
(iˆ, jˆ, kˆ) 29 22 23 70 23 7
false negative 3.62 × 10−27 2.08 × 10−45 2.91 × 10−33 4.46 × 10−28 3.53 × 10−30 1.25 × 10−41
false positive 2.95 × 10−28 2.95 × 10−28 2.95 × 10−28 2.95 × 10−28 2.95 × 10−28 2.95 × 10−28
threshold-based Solution
m 53 49 52 68 60 47
p 0.1315 0.1137 0.1182 0.1250 0.1206 0.1093
false negative 3.79 × 10−53 9.68 × 10−55 1.58 × 10−53 1.65 × 10−48 9.00 × 10−51 1.27 × 10−55
false positive 1.06 × 10−59 1.25 × 10−65 4.82 × 10−64 9.22 × 10−62 3.19 × 10−63 3.03 × 10−67
6.5.8 Result of PIT-based Key Generation
Seven key generation HDAs are compared in Table 6.6. According to our tests, the
failure rate of the traditional RO PUF is not good enough even after we apply a non-
standard BCH(244, 128, 15) ECC. Both [8] and [9] have a failure rate of 10−6, but they
require large amounts of helper data. In [7], BCH(63, 24, 7) ECC is used to reach a
failure rate of 10−38. However, the data rate and key length are still limitations. As a
comparison, our floating thresholding solution with helper data has quite a low failure
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rate. In addition, the key length is variable while the other methods have fixed key. The
helper data for each key requires only 7 + 7 × nmax + nmax + 10 bits, which means 7-bit
start point, 7-bit location for each marginal point, nmax-bit parity, and 10-bit checksum.
For more than 90% keys with floating thresholds, helper data is not even necessary.
Therefore, the average data rate is very low.












PUF type RO PUF RO PUF SRAM PUF RO PUF hybrid RO PUF RO PUF
key length (bit) 128 128 128 128 24 128 (variable) 128 (variable)
PUF cells 128 128 1536 450 not applied 256 256
helper data (bit) 0 116 13952 1850 39 0 17 + 8 × nmax
data rate 1 0.52 0.01 0.06 0.38 1 ≈0.98
RBER 7.13% 7.13% 15% 9% 30% 7.13% 7.13%
failure rate 1 4.08 × 10−3 10−6 10−6 2.01 × 10−38 8.72 × 10−2 9.38 × 10−8
We also evaluate our solution on different types of PUFs, as shown in Table 6.7.
To build a PIT with the same depth of 16384, the minimum number of basic cells for
each PUF is given for comparison. As we mentioned, two 128-RO arrays are sufficient
to construct the RO PUF PIT by selecting one RO from each array (1282). For Arbiter
PUFs and BR PUFs, their entropies benefit from the serial architectures, which require
only 14-bit challenge input and related units to build a PIT (214). Thus, the basic cell
amount should be as least 14×4 MUXes for 2-XOR Arbiter PUFs and 14×1 MUX and
132
DEMUX for BR PUFs. However, the response bits of Butterfly PUFs are independent
as the selected cross-coupled latches do not affect the output of others. As a result,
16384 × 2 latches are used in the Butterfly PUF. We also provide the LUT and FF
utilization for implementing a PIT for each PUF. To obtain the failure rate, we randomly
generate one billion keys for each PIT with the same seed. For the Butterfly PUF that
keeps a similar RBER as the RO PUF, its failure rate is slightly reduced, but still on the
order of 10−8. On the other hand, when the RBER is cut in half as with the Arbiter PUF,
the failure rate decreases sharply to 10−9. If the RBER further drops to the degree as
that of the Bistable Ring PUFs, no errors were detected in the key set, which means the
false negative is smaller than 10−9. In summary, the performance of this algorithm is
most affected by the raw bit error rate in the PUF responses, but its accuracy is sufficient
for key generation on different PUFs.
6.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a strong solution for PUF authentication and key gener-
ation. We investigated the possibility of PUF post-processing methods. We demon-
strated the accuracy of PUF responses with initialization tables, which achieves an
average bit error rate below 0.48%. By using PIT, the failure rate and the collision
rate of authentication also decreased significantly. For the most critical key generation
applications, we use PITs and dynamic floating thresholds to select the stable bits as
output. With our helper data correction, the failure rates of four different PUF-based
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Table 6.7: Performance Comparison of Floating Thresholding Solution with Helper
Data on Four Different Types of PUFs
PUF type RO PUF Arbiter PUF Butterfly PUF BR PUF
key length 128 128 128 128
basic cells 256 ROs 56 MUXes 32768 Latches 28 DE/MUXes
LUT 3316 97 38960 75
FF 2675 68 16912 30
RBER 7.13% 3.31% 6.80% 1.42%
failure rate 9.30 × 10−8 5.00 × 10−9 8.50 × 10−8 < 1.00 × 10−9
key generators are reduced to 10−8. Finally, we evaluate the overall performance of the
hybrid solution. The overhead is extremely low compared to the existing algorithms.
Chapter 7
Locality Sensitive Hash Function for Similarity Search and
Clustering
7.1 Introduction
In an e-world, the rapid growth of data leads to the impossibility of searching large
amounts of data by brute force, which leads to an ever-increasing need for fast indexing
and searching of large databases. To make large-scale search practical, researchers have
explored multiple approximate similarity search techniques. One novel and interesting
approach is called the locality sensitive hash function, which solves the approximate
or exact near neighbor search problem in high dimensional spaces. LSH hashes input
items so that similar items map to the same “buckets” with high probability. Unlike
conventional cryptographic hash functions, LSH aims to maximize the probability of a
“collision” for similar items.
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7.2 Locality Sensitive Hash Function Background
To define a formal definition of a function h in the general LSH family F [51], it should
satisfy the following conditions for any two points p, q, which belong to a metric space
(M, d): if d(p, q) ≤ R, then the probability that h(p) = h(q) is at least P1; if d(p, q) ≥
cR, then the probability that h(p) = h(q) is at most P2. A family is interesting when
P1 > P2. Then F is called (R, cR, P1, P2) − sensitive [52]. The easiest LSH software
approach is bit sampling for Hamming distance, which selects a random bit from the
input d-dimensional vectors: {0, 1}d → {0, 1}. It has the following parameters: P1 =
1 − R/d, P2 = 1 − cR/d. In spite of easy computation, bit sampling is not a suitable
solution for the high bit error rate scenario, as it causes significant false positive and
false negative [53]. Another popular LSH is MinHash [54]. By applying the Jaccard
index, MinHash is defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union
of the sample sets. Thus, Pr[h(A) = h(B)] = J(A, B) = |A ⋂ B|/|A ⋃ B|. However, it
has the same shortage as that of bit sampling. Given 128-bit input strings with 12
different bits, the identification rate is only 0.83, which is not enough for similarity
search applications. To achieve better performance, TLSH is proposed to process a byte
string by using a sliding window to populate an array of bucket counts and construct the
digest body with different binary values [55]. However, it requires an input byte stream
with a minimum length of 512 bytes. As a consequence, TLSH cannot be applied to
strings with variable length.
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7.3 Motivations
As we have mentioned in the previous chapters, FPGA-based PUFs are suitable for
authentication and key generation. We would like to extend the similar architecture to
a wider range of applications. To meet the essential requirement of identifying similar
items, we propose a novel FPGA-based LSH (FLSH) design in this chapter. This new
LSH is designed with strong fault tolerant capability and high identification accuracy
in mind. The second advantage is that, since our approach uses asynchronous logic in
FPGAs instead of the complex processor calculation, it is low-cost and fast compared to
the software based LSHs. On the other side, FLSH can be applied to clustering as well.
However, to achieve these goals, the implementation on FPGAs requires strict place-
ment and routing in order to control the internal wire delay. Therefore, we explore the
FLSH implementation details with complex placement and routing policies. To prove
the reality of FLSH-based similarity search and clustering applications, we evaluate
the physical characteristics of FLSHs, including randomness, convergence, and fault
tolerant capability.
7.4 FLSH Design and Implementation
We present the details of our FLSH design and implementation in this section. Unlike
the general software-based LSHs, FLSH does not rely on processors for hash calcu-
lation. Instead, it is mainly constructed with lookup tables (LUTs) and latches. This
low-cost design is more flexible and can be easily integrated into other hardware system
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designs.
7.4.1 LUT-based FLSH Array Design
FLSH is built around a 2D array comprised of M × M cells. The array scale depends
on the available hardware resources and the input length. In our example, we choose an
architecture that contains 16 × 16 cells, which can be implemented in 256 configurable
logic blocks (CLBs) of a Kintex-7 FPGA. There are two types of cells: (M − 2)2 cells
in the middle are connected with their neighboring cells by four bidirectional signals
from different directions; and 4M − 4 cells on the boundary receive the inputs from
the internal cells as well as a 4M-bit input data. Figure 7.1 shows the interconnect
between 9 cells in a 16 × 16 array. Each cell takes in the input data and generates a 4-
bit hash output that is connected to its neighbors. Because of the asynchronous cycles
in the array, it takes time for the outputs to converge to a stable output which is then
saved in a 4M2-bit FLSH output register. Theoretically, each of the four input wires
to a cell should have identical delays. However, due to the physical randomness in
the manufacturing process, each FPGA will generate a unique hardware hash function
under this architecture. As a summary of the hashing process, in our 16 × 16 array,
when a input is ready to broadcast, the system enables the 256-cell array for automatic
calculation until most of the bits converge. Then it sends the 1,024 bitmap to the FLSH
output register.
Figure 7.2 shows the internal structure of an FLSH cell. The cell input in[3 : 0]
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Fig. 7.1: Topology of FLSH network
comes from the neighboring cell outputs. It is connected to the main logic LUTs, latch
LUTs, and shift LUTs in the cell. The logic LUTs (LUT6 NORT H, LUT6 WES T ,
LUT6 S OUT H, LUT6 EAS T ) determine the 4-bit output value of a cell. Given the
difference of wire delay from the neighboring cells, we use LUT4 LATCH1 to lock
the logic LUT output at a certain time through its LDCE (Transparent Data Latch with
Asynchronous Clear and Gate Enable). These outputs (out north, out west, out south,
out east) are not only the input of the neighboring cells, but also part of the FLSH
output. As we know, a 4-bit input can select a 1-bit output from the 16-bit initial
values in a LUT. However, according to our tests, if we only use in[3 : 0] as logic
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LUT input, the output pattern is too simple in term of a hash function. Thus, shift
functions (LUT6 S HIFT1, LUT6 S HIFT2, LDCE S HIFT1, LDCE S HIFT2) are
added to improve the output complexity. Both LUT6 S HIFT1 and LUT6 S HIFT2
share the input from in[3 : 0] and their LDCEs. For further timing consideration,
we add another latch LUT4 LATCH2 to lock LDCE S HIFT1 and LDCE S HIFT2
output. When the logic LUTs receive the 2-bit shift instruction from the LDCEs, there
are four combinations of logic operations. We show an example in Table 7.1. If the shift
bits are “00”, the output will be selected from the original 16-bit initial value. When the
shift bits change to “01”, we apply a 1-bit left shift to the original initial value. When
they are “10”, a 1-bit right shift is executed instead. For the last case “11”, all the 16
bits are flipped to generate new initial values. In this way, we generate the 64-bit initial
lookup table for the logic LUTs.
7.4.2 FLSH Placement
Place and route is an essential step to control the wire delay in our FLSH in order to
meet the critical timing requirement of LSHs. For each cell, the input signals should
keep the same delay in order to involve the physical randomness of FPGAs themselves.
To clarify this feature, the same challenge can generate unique hash values on different
FPGAs, but one FPGA will always provide identical responses to very similar chal-
lenges. Instead of using timing constraints to achieve this goal, it is more reasonable to
find some CLBs with equivalent delay path between each other. We select 256 CLBs
140
Fig. 7.2: Basic FLSH cell structure in a CLB
to build a 16 × 16 array in Figure 7.3. Note that there is a visible distortion that the dis-
tance in the middle looks larger than others, but the actual paths between those CLBs
are very close to each other and can be adjusted by manual routing. Since the scale
of the array may be changed according to the input length, manual placement is not
efficient. To make the implementation flow more flexible, scripts are used to generate
the placement constraints automatically.
According to our design requirement, a CLB should perform the entire function
of an FLSH cell. In Kintex-7 FPGAs, a CLB provides two slices. In each slice, there
are four 6-input LUTs and eight flip-flops as well as multiplexers and arithmetic carry
logic [31]. Therefore, the primitives in a CLB is sufficient to build one FLSH cell. We
141
















0000 0 1 0 1
0001 0 0 1 1
0010 1 0 0 0
0011 0 1 0 1
0100 0 0 1 1
0101 1 0 0 0
0110 0 1 1 1
0111 1 0 0 0
1000 0 1 1 1
1001 1 0 1 0
1010 1 1 0 0
1011 0 1 1 1
1100 1 0 0 0
1101 0 1 0 1
1110 0 0 1 1
1111 1 0 0 0
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Fig. 7.3: FLSH array with 16 × 16 cells
provide an example in Figure 7.4, which shows how the LUTs and LDCEs locate in a
CLB. On the left side, we place LUT4 LATCH2, LUT4 LATCH1, LUT6 S HIFT1,
LUT6 S HIFT2, LUT6 NORT H, LUT6 WES T , LUT6 S OUT H, and LUT6 EAS T
from top to bottom. LDCE S HIFT1, LDCE S HIFT2, LDCE NORT H, LDCE WES T ,
LDCE S OURT H, and LDCE EAS T locate on the right side. It is important to note
that the wires in Figure 7.4 only show the logical connection, which cannot present
the correct delay of the post-routing paths. For some critical paths, manual routing is
applied for accurate delay control.
7.4.3 FLSH Routing
The most challenging step implementing the FLSH architecture is controlling the wire
delay between cells. “Matching delays” is a vain hope in any FPGA, as it is not prac-
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Fig. 7.4: Basic FLSH cell placement
tical. Even though the placement constraints have been applied, Vivado may select
unexpected paths, which leads to additional delay. From the statistical results of our
implementations, more than 90% of the delay meets the timing constraints to some de-
gree while the rest do not follow the desired routing path. Though we routed the wires
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manually to keep the delay equivalent, it is hard to eliminate the difference entirely.
As shown in Figure 7.5, the delay between the center cell and neighboring cells is not
exactly the same. To minimize the difference, we apply fixed routing constraints. On
the other hand, manual routing is known to be very time-consuming for large scale
design. By fixing the routing paths, the implementation efficiency can be significantly
improved.
Fig. 7.5: Critical wire routing among cells
7.5 FLSH Application
LSH has been applied to several problem domains including near-duplicate detection,
digital fingerprinting, image similarity identification, and hierarchical clustering. In
145
this section, we will introduce two typical applications of FLSH: similarity search and
clustering.
7.5.1 Similarity Search
As a popular similarity search solution, LSH is widely applied for image databases,
document collections, time-series databases, and genome databases. Unlike conven-
tional LSHs that can map similar items to the same “buckets” in memory with high
probability, FLSH transfers a string to a unique bitmap, as our asynchronous logic in
the FPGA holds capabilities to generate similar bitmaps with similar strings. Thus,
FLSH can be applied to similarity search application.
The fundamental issue of this application is how to extract the feature from two
items efficiently. To post-process the hash value, we provide a simple but practical
algorithm called max-min pooling. As shown in Figure 7.6, we first divide the 16 × 16
cell array into 16 sets. Every set contains 4× 4 cells, which means 64 output bits. Then
we accumulate the number of ‘1’s in each set. By comparing the sum values, two sets
with the maximum and the minimum value are marked as ‘1’ while other sets are ‘0’.
If there are equivalent extremums, we set all of them to ‘1’. In this way, we compress
the 1024-bit hash output to a 4 × 4 bitmap, which, because of biasing, usually includes
2 ‘1’s and 14 ‘0’s. When we compare the 16-bit sets from similar inputs, they can
coincide with high probabilities. Though we use 64-bit input in our example, the actual
length can be flexible. As a solution of any shorter input, the missing part is filled with
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‘0’. If the length is more than 64-bit, we can divide the input into several 64-bit sections
and apply Exclusive or (XOR) operation to fix the length to 64-bit. Alternatively, we
use scripts to reconstruct the architecture by extending the scale with more cells.
Fig. 7.6: Cell reconstruction and hash regeneration of max-min pooling
7.5.2 Clustering
Clustering is a task of grouping a set of objects so that objects in the same group are
more similar than those in other groups. Since FLSH output has the similar feature, we
propose a convolutional weight algorithm to develop this application. Figure 7.7 shows
a few FLSH cells with different colors. Each cell contains 4 bits. Thus, the total bitmap
size is 32× 32. In this algorithm, we build a red frame that includes 13 bits. Depending
on the location, they are set with different weights. For example, bit(i, j) in the center
obtains a weight of 7. Then we give a weight of 3 to bit(i−1, j), bit(i+1, j), bit(i, j−1),
bit(i, j + 1), which are directly connected to the center bit. Next, a weight of 2 is set to
bit(i − 1, j − 1), bit(i + 1, j − 1), bit(i − 1, j + 1), bit(i + 1, j + 1), which locate in the
diagonal direction. Finally, the farthest four bits, bit(i − 2, j), bit(i + 2, j), bit(i, j − 2),
147
bit(i, j + 2), receive the minimum weight of 1. Now we calculate the convolutional
weight of bit(i, j) by multiplying every bit with the corresponding weight.
When two items are given for clustering, our FLSH generates the 32× 32 bitmap
for each input. We shift the center of the red frame from the first bit(0, 0) to the last
bit(31, 31) in order to calculate the convolutional weight for each bit. If a bit locates
at the boundary of the bitmap, we will fill the missing parts with ‘0’. After 1,024 shift
and calculation, the bitmaps are transferred to two 32 × 32 “weightmaps”. Then we
compare the weights in the same location. If the absolute difference is smaller than
a pre-defined threshold, the corresponding bits are recorded as matched to a degree.
Otherwise, they are not in the same cluster. When most of the weight pairs are matched,
these two strings are regarded as similar. The similarity coefficient can be used to
evaluate the result of the convolutional weight algorithm for classification tasks. Note
that we generate larger hash redundancies than its input to improve the performance.
Since the similarity coefficient replaces the bitmap as output, it will not cause more
overhead than other LSHs.
7.6 Evaluation and Discussion
In this section, we provide on-board measured results of our FLSH implementation.
During the tests, the environment is set to the normal condition. The proposed FLSH
needs 2048 LUTs, which takes only 1% resources of the XC7K325T-2FFG900C FPGA.
Compared to other LSHs that require processors, the hardware utilization of FLSH is
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Fig. 7.7: Weight distribution of convolutional weight algorithm
very lightweight.
7.6.1 Convergence Rate
As a hash function, the output is required to be stable. However, FLSHs output random
data at the beginning, then it converges gradually. Due to our asynchronous circuit
design and wire delay policy, the metastability and randomness are reasonable in the
output. To obtain stable hashes, we tried different proportions of the logic LUT initial
values. Technically, an obvious bias leads to a faster data convergence rate. However,
too many ‘1’s or ‘0’s cause the loss of functionality. We have set LUT initial table
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Fig. 7.8: The sample of FLSH output from Xilinx integrated logic analyzer
with 80% of ‘0’ and 20% of ‘1’ as the best tradeoff. To prove that, we used the Xilinx
integrated logic analyzer to get 1,024 samples of the FLSH array output, as shown
in Figure 7.8. Each column presents the hex values from 256 cells at a certain clock
cycle. From left to right, the random hash becomes stable. Particularly, there is an
avalanche convergence after the 400th sample. After that, more than 95% of FLSH
cells become stable. The time to reach the convergence also decides the speed of FLSH.
From our measurement, hash output converges at the 450th sampling clock cycles on
average. Since the sampling clock cycle is 5 ns, the speed of FLSHs is calculated to be
444 KHashes/s or 434 Mibps.
Figure 7.9 provides the instability data trends along with the sampling time. If
we collect the hash value before the 400th clock cycle, the convergence rate is less than
93%. However, the amount of unstable bits drops suddenly and the curve becomes flat,
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as an avalanche convergence occurs in the interval between the 400th and 450th clock
cycle. According to our measurements, 450 clock periods are sufficient for the output
convergence.
Fig. 7.9: The relationship between the sampling time and the different bits in the output
7.6.2 Randomness
Conventional hash functions have strict randomness requirement for their hash values.
Ideally, even if there is only one bit flipped in the input, 50% of the output should
change. However, this concept does not fit the LSH family due to its special function-
ality. LSH output should not be influenced significantly by a few input bits, but it still
produces random outputs when 50% of the input bits flip. Therefore, the NIST test [36]
is not a suitable standard to evaluate the randomness of LSH. Instead, we show an vi-
sual comparison in Figure 7.10. We display bit ‘1’ as white and ‘0’ as black on the 32
× 32 bitmaps. Given two random inputs, the FLSH generates entirely different hash
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values. As we mentioned above, the FLSH output produces more 0 outputs than 1’s.
Fig. 7.10: Comparison of 32 × 32 bitmap with random inputs on an FLSH
Clearly, one sample cannot demonstrate the randomness of FLSHs. To verify it in
a statistical sense, we use a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) based pseudo random
number generator (PRNG) to generate 10,000 challenges for testing. By accumulating
the number of times a ‘1’ appears in each location, we can calculate the probability
and evaluate the randomness. From the 32 × 32 bitmap shown in Figure 7.11, there is
no intensive fluctuation on the surface, which means the ‘1’s distribute evenly in the
output. Note that the logic LUT input is not always random. It is affected by the shift
logic and the initial input values. As a result, the ratio of ‘1’ and ‘0’ in the output may
have a bias, compared to the pre-set initial value in Table 7.1.
7.6.3 Fault Tolerant Capability
The fault tolerant capability determines the performance of an LSH. A good LSH
should be able to find the similarity between two items without being affected by the
existing differences. When the same input is hashed, more ‘1’s are expected to be put
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Fig. 7.11: Probability of ‘1’ in the bitmap of FLSH
in the same buckets. Figure 7.12 compares two bitmaps generated by an FLSH with the
same input. Since the convergence rate of FLSHs is smaller than 1, some hash values
are not stable. As a result, there are 1.7% mismatched bits. However, this defect can be
safely ignored as FLSH has strong fault tolerant capability.
Fig. 7.12: Comparison of 32 × 32 bitmap with the same input on an FLSH
Figure 7.13 shows the relationship between the flipped bits of the input and the
mismatched bits of the relevant output. As increasing errors are injected in the hash
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input, FLSH outputs more different bits. When there is more than eight bit errors in
the input, the unstable output contains more than 100 bits, which means the stability
drops below 90% and may affect the fault tolerant capability. However, this result is
acceptable as the raw data of hash output. With our post-processing algorithms, we are
still able to improve the performance of the FLSH-based applications.
Fig. 7.13: FLSH output instability with different input errors
7.6.4 Similarity Search Result
The performance of FLSH-based similarity search is shown in Table 7.2. As a com-
parison with the traditional LSHs, the Hamming and Minhash similarity rate are tested
with the same data set. Though the max-min pooling output is compressed to only 16
bits, the algorithm still provides a good similarity rate as the Hamming similarity does.
Thus, given the 64-bit strings in our example, max-min pooling algorithm can be safely
applied to similarity search.
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92.06% 91.22% 90.35% 89.87% 88.01% 85.72% 82.90%
Apart from the ability to detect similarity, we also need to show that FLSH can
discriminate between dissimilar inputs. We use PRNG to generate two input data sets,
with 10,000 random strings in each group. According to the results of the FLSH and
convolutional weight algorithm, there are 437 mismatched bits in the 1,024-bit output
on average. If we set the threshold to 100, the application can distinguish two random
strings with a probability of almost 100%.
7.6.5 Clustering Result
According to Table 7.3, the number of mismatched bits in the bitmap increases when
there are more different bits in the input sets. The same data shown in Figure 7.13
demonstrates the relationship between input bit errors and output bit errors. However,
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the amount of mismatched bits grows faster after the fifth column. As a result, the
Hamming similarity of FLSH bitmaps drops rapidly. When we apply the convolutional
weight algorithm, the mismatched bits are significantly reduced. We set the weight
threshold to 8 in our tests. Even though there are 10 different bits in the 64-bit in-
put, our solution can generate 1,012 matched bits. The similarity rate is improved to
98.83%, which means only 1.17% inputs cannot be classified correctly. While the max-
min pooling algorithm fits similarity search well, the convolutional weight algorithm
performs better for clustering application.




















100.00% 99.71% 99.41% 98.83% 97.27% 93.75% 88.77%
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As was noted earlier, with a 200 MHz clock on the FPGA and a convergence
time of 450 samples, the FLSH can produce over 444 KHashes/s. The convolutional
weight algorithm can be pipelined with the FLSH process, thus keeping the same hash
rate of 444 KHashes/s. As a point of comparison, a Python software implementation of
Minhash delivers only 3279 hashes/s on an Intel i7-4770 processor, roughly 135 times
slower than the FPGA-based FLSH implementation.
7.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, an FPGA-based locality sensitive hash function is proposed to identify
similar strings. We present the details of FLSH architecture, implementation, conver-
gence, randomness, and stability. When there are bit errors in the hash input, our FLSH
can tolerate them and keep most output unchanged. In the similarity search and cluster-
ing application, our algorithms provide reasonable performance and improvement. In




Though many security solutions have been developed recently for the increasing needs
of embedded systems and IoTs, there is still space for further improvement in the per-
formance, cost, and security level of these systems. The trade-off becomes significant,
since quite a few devices can not support very strong encryption with large computa-
tional complexity, but still require a certain degree of security. Therefore, designers
must consider all aspects and find a balance between performance and cost. Physical
unclonable functions, thus, become an ideal security primitive with strong advantages.
In this thesis, we developed new architectures and novel techniques to overcome some
of the main shortcomings of PUFs. The major contributions of our work will be sum-
marized in this chapter.
8.1 PUF Design Optimization and Implementation
Physical unclonable functions are known as a security primitive for various applica-
tions. Its instability limits the usage as a strong error correction code is usually required,
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which increases the total hardware resource utilization significantly. In chapter 2, sev-
eral optimizations on the hardware architecture are proposed in order to improve the
stability and reduce the system cost. With a shift register or hash function implementa-
tion on the FPGA, the required number of ROs decreases to only 128. By involving the
IDELAY2 module, we are able to adjust the timing of the RO output and improve the
stability.
8.2 Secure Authentication Solution with PUF Response Instability
For most PUF research, unstable bits generated by RO pairs are usually regarded as
a negative part that should be eliminated or ignored for output. However, we demon-
strate its positive aspect in chapter 3. By converting the unstable bits to stable output,
using unstable-stable responses is proved to be a practical solution for authentication.
Compared to the traditional ECC methods, USR achieves better performance. We also
propose another algorithm using the instability of PUFs. The obfuscation design can
guarantee a high security level of PUF responses against modeling attacks.
8.3 PUF Initialization Table for Robust Authentication and Key Generation
For some applications that need high accuracy, the bit error rate in PUF responses
should be as low as possible. In chapter 4, we comprehensively evaluate the lower
bound of PUF BER on FPGAs. We propose a floating thresholding solution to reduce
the bit error rate in PUF responses and improve the performance of PUF-based appli-
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cations. We combine the error correction scheme and bit selection scheme together by
using an initialization table and unique helper data. Our results show that this novel
approach improves the stability and data rate of various PUFs significantly.
8.4 Ring Weight Algorithm for Lightweight Authentication
Counterfeit Integrated Circuits (IC) can be very harmful to the security and reliability
of critical applications. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) have been proposed as a
mechanism for uniquely identifying ICs and thus reducing the prevalence of counter-
feits. However, maintaining large databases of PUF challenge response pairs (CRPs)
and dealing with PUF errors make it difficult to use PUFs reliably. To satisfy the au-
thentication requirement of low-cost devices, we proposed a novel fuzzy identification
scheme in chapter 5. It presents an innovative approach to authenticate CRPs on PUF-
based ICs. The proposed method can tolerate considerable bit errors from responses of
PUFs without the use of error correcting codes. Different types of optimization methods
are applied to improve the overall performance.
8.5 Locality Sensitive Hash Function for Similarity Search and Clustering
Locality sensitive hash functions (LSHs) are a widely used approach to identify sim-
ilar items or nearest neighbors in a data set. However, LSH algorithms have rarely
been explored in hardware implementations. In chapter 6, we propose a novel locality
sensitive hash function design and implementation using FPGAs. By using the unique
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hardware delay generated during the fabrication process, we can identify the bitmaps
from similar inputs. Our results have verified the efficiency and accuracy of our LSH
for similarity search and clustering applications.
8.6 Summary of Conclusions
This thesis is devoted to a PUF-based trade-off design and algorithms for authentication
and key generation applications on embedded systems and IoTs.
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